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Turkey's adjustment  experience  was  a tremen-  market-oriented  economy  - substantially
dous success  in terms of structurally  reorienting  diminished.
the economy.  The share of output  for export  rose
from 5 percent  in 1979  to 23 percent  in 1989,  The reforms  of the early 1980s  greatly
and real output  roughly doubled.  The financial  reduced  the importance  of rent-seeking,  particu-
markets  opened  and have developed  depth and  larly through  foreign  trade, but patronage  politics
sophistication.  The program  failed to reduce  became  widespread  again  in the second  half of
fiscal deficits,  inflation,  income inequality,  and  the  decade. The initial strength  ANAP  derived
the size of the inefficient  public enterprise  sector,  from privileged  access  to state resources  progres-
but the transfonnation  of trade and finance  sively  became  a disadvantage,  creating  resent-
fundamentally  altered  the context  of the prob-  ment and reaction  among  the populace.  One
lems, changing  their  effects on the private sector  source of discontent  was the over-invoicing  of
and changing  the government's  options  for  exports  (that is, "fictitious  exports"),  designed  to
dealing with them.  take advantage  of favorable  export subsidies,  and
the government's  failure  to discipline  or penalize
The first phase of economic  adjustment  was  the companies  involved.  This jeopardized
susilned,  although  not initiated,  in an authoritar-  attempts  to build a pro-export  coalition,  and
ian  context, but the Turks restored  democracy  some key features  of import  substitution  contin-
when the agenda for reforn was incomplete.  The  ued.
Motherland  Party (ANAP)  won office  on the
platforn of economic  success  and eventualy lost  Oni, and Webb  attribute  the failure  of
partly because  of the failure  of economic  policy.  Turkey's macroeconomic  policies in the late
ANAP's  electoral  defeat in 1991  did not mean,  1980s  to the government's  failu.e to cultivate
however,  the demise  of the pro-structural  adjust-  popular  support  for macroeconomic  stability;  to
ment or the pro-liberalization  coalitions.  The  the top bureaucrats'  lack of autonomy  to coun-
long period  of ANAP  rule helped  consolidate  teract  political  pressures  to expand  the fiscal
reforms  to such a degree  that all of the principal  deficit;  and to the continuation  of top-down
parties agreed  on a broadly  similar economic  individualistic  linkages  between  policymakers
program.  The ideological  differences  between  and key economic  interests.
the left and the right-  a state-directed  versus  a
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Turkey in the 1980s undertook  both major structural reforms of its economy and the
restoration of democracy. In many respects it succeeded  on both fronts, but it did not
complete the agenda for democratization  and it had some conspicuous  failures of economic
policy, which were closely linked to the way that the program became subservient  to short-
term political  concerns.  The Turkish experience illustrates how a small group of technocrats
outside the traditional bureaucracy, organized under a strong leader, can play a key role in
the initiation and implementation  of structural adjustment policies.  Turkey's transition to
democracy was controlled from above, as the military and the successor  government
gradually broadened the scope for popular participation  in politics.  This helped to contain
distributional pressures and to maintain  the principal reform measures  in the initial years of
political liberalization.
Political liberalization  from above kept power concentrated  with the executive,
however, and became a disadvantage  during the later stages of the adjustment  process, when
Turkey faced the challenge of simultaneously  sustaining  the reform momentum  and to
extending the scope of democracy. Thus, paradoxically,  a concentrated  and insulated  policy-
making process, which helped to initiate and implement  reform during the early stages,
became progressively more of a liability for sustaining  the program.  The top-down  political
liberalization  perpetuated the paternalistic tradition of Turkish government and the absence of
strong consultative  links on policy matters between the government  and peak associations  of
interest groups.  This undermined  the consolidation  of both reform and democracy. Because
peak associations  were weak, the party system bore undue pressure in mobilizing  political
support for the economic  program.
The political  developments  affected the prospects for economic  reform in diverse
ways, which are well illustrated by the evolution of trade and macroeconomic  policies.
Trade reforms and export promotion successfully  served three purposes in the adjustment
strategy of the government in the 1980s:  to alleviate balance of payments  constraints, to
restore the confidence of the international  financial  institutions  and external creditors, and to
stimulate efficient economic growth.  The reforms succeeded  in making the Turkish economy
more efficient and much more outward oriented, and in establishing  a higher standard of
expectations  for the quality of economic policy making. The economic success of the
reforms engendered political support for them;  table 1 shows the steady growth of output
and the spectacular  growth of exports during the 1980s. The government  and ruling party
usually reaped only a part of these political  benefits, however, and efforts to use trade policy
to get explicit voter support led to partial reversals of the program.
In contrast to trade, macroeconomic  policy witnessed frequent, serious reversals.  The
resulting high inflation, high real interest rates, unstable  real exchange rate, and uncertainty
about future fiscal policy made economic  recovery slower and less stable than it could have
been.  The ruling party of 1983-91  paid the political  price for these failures, although  it also
- 1-Table 1.  Turkey: 1975 - 1990  2  Political  &oonorny  of Policy  Refonn  in Turkey
tURKEY  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
.....  .....  ..............................  .... ,....  . . ...........  ......................  ................  ................................  ............................................................................... 
. Growth  of  GDP  8.9  8.4  7.5  -2.9  2.1  -0.8  4.4  5.0  3.7  5.7  5.1  8.3  7.4  3.6  1.0  NA
CPI  Inflation  "A  17  27  45  59  110  37  31  31  48  45  35  39  75  70  64
Curr.Acco.Deficit  -4.6  -4.9  -6.6  -2.4  -2.0  -6.0  -3.4  -1.8  -3.8  -2.8  -1.9  -2.5  -1.2  2.3  1.2  -2.4 to GDP  ratio
Exports  6.5  7.0  4.9  5.7  4.9  6.6  10.4  14.9  15.7  19.6  20.9  17.6  20.8  24.6  22.5  NA to  GDP  ratio
Grouth  of  Exports  2  21  -18  14  -9  4  85  40  14  20  12  -1  27  20  5  10
For.Debt  Service  11  11  16  16  21  28  29  29  29  23  32  32  33  35  34  NA to Exports ratio
Foreign  Debt  136  127  .192  219  318  403  255  205  200  170  177  239  223  193  193  NA to  Exports  ratio
Reserves  21  20  12  19  12  15  12  13  15  12  10  13  13  16  27  NA to  ilports  ratio
Real  Exchange  Rate  195  194  206  204  231  243  178  143  144  119  100  114  128  137  111  145 Index
Central Government  22  23  27  26  28  26  24  NA  24  25  25  21  22  21  23  24 Expenditure  to GDP  ratio
Central Government  21  22  22  23  23  22  23  NA  20  15  18  18  18  17  18  19 Revenue  to GDP  ratio
Public  Sec. Borrowing  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  -1.1  5.3  1.7  9.7  6.4  4.8  8.0  6.1  7.2  9.5 Requirement  to  GDP  ratio
Growth  of Honey  (HZ)  NA  23.4  33.8  36.5  61.7  74.4  88.2  51.1  29.7  58.7  55.3  43.8  45.6  55.0  72.0  51.4
Central Goverrnent  Wage  7.6  7.9  7.6  8.5  9.0  8.2  3.5  NA  5.9  4.9  4.6  4.6  5.1  4.9  7.3  8.9 Bill  to GOP  ratio
Real  Uages  1n  Hanuf.  107  112  133  138  142  119  125  119  118  104  100  96  102  97  94  NA Cepi  (IL)  deflated,  index)
Real  Wages  In  Hanuf.  101  109  126  124  115  107  121  118  118  103  100  100  111  111  110  NA (wpi  (TI.)  deflated,  index)
Doltar  Uages  in  Hainf.  2780  3063  4124  4615  5891  4231  4154  3535  3323  2667  2618  2613  3036  3065  3356  NA
Uneqployent  rate  NA  NA  NA  7.8  9.7  11.6  11.6  11.7  12.1  11.8  11.7  10.5  9.5  8.0  8.2  7.7Data  Description:  Data  Sources:
Growth  of GDP  IHF-IFS
CPI Inflation  Period  averages
Curr.Acco.Deficit  Current  Account  Deficit  as percentage  of GDP
to  GDP ratio
Exports  (GNFS)  :  Exports  of  goods  and services  as  percentage  of GDP
to GDP  ratio
Growth  of  Exports  :  Rate  of  growth  of  real  exports
(real)
For.Debt  Service  U.DebtT.  :  Foreign  Debt  Service  (interest  + amortization)  as  percentage  of  exports
to  Exports  ratio
Foreign  Debt  n  Public  and  publicly  guaranteed
to  Exports  ratio
Reserves  IMF-IFS  Total  reserves  minus  gold  as  percentage  of annual  imports
to Imports  ratio
Real  Exchange  Rate  Real,  dollar  weighted  exchange  rate  index  (annual  averages)
Index
Central  Government  IMF-GFS
Expenditure  to  GDP ratio
Central  Government
Revenue  to  GDP ratio
Public  Sec.  Borrowing  The  World  Bank  Country  Study,  1990  and  C.E.H.,  Oct.1991
Requirement  to  GDP ratio  :  Public  Sector  Borrowing  Requirement  to GDP  ratio
Growth  of Money  (M2)  IHF-IFS
Central  Government  Wage  IHF-GFS
Bill  to GDP  ratio
Real  Wage Index  in  Hanuf.  UNIDO  :  Real  wage  bill  per  worker  in  manufacturing  sector  .TL  CPI  deflated,  index  1985=100)
(cpi  (IL)  deflated,  Index)
Real  Wage  in  Manuf.  Real  wag,  bill  per  worker  in  manufacturing  sector  (TL  UPI  deflated,  index  1985=100)
(wpi  (TL)  deflated,  index)
Dollar  Wages  in  Hanuf.  Uage  bill  per  worker  in  manufacturing  sector  (in  U.S.  dollars).
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reaped some short-term  political benefits from the spending  and credit policies that underlay
the macroeconomic  problems.
The paper starts with an historical  overview of the political  and economic
transformation  in Turkey.  The next section describes the institutions involved  formally and
informally in making economic  policy, which include the constitution,  bureaucracy, parties,
and interest groups.  The third main section looks at how these institutions  and the dynamics
of the democratization  process affected the evolution  of trade and macroeconomic  policy.
The final section draws the lessons from the Turkish experience for the political management
of policy reform.
A.  HISTORICAL  PERIODS
The political  developments  in Turkey in the 1980s can be usefully broken into four
periods -- the political  crisis up to the time of the military intervention, the military
interregnum, the initiation of democracy, and the consolidation  of democracy.
Political crisis
The first period stretches back into the 1970s, when the economic  and political
systems were experiencing  increasing difficulties.  The import-substitution  strategy of the
1960s and the 1970s  had generated  an economy highly dependent  on imports and foreign
borrowing, but with limited capacity to export.  The government borrowed imprudently  to
mitigate the growth-retarding  impact of the first oil shock, but was too far in debt to borrow
its way out of the second shock in 1979.  Foreign lenders had cut off credit to Turkey after
1977, and by 1979 other foreign exchange inflows were declining, as workers abroad
reduced their remittances and exports declined because of exchange rate overvaluation  and
shortages of imported imports.  The oil shock of 1979 then led to a severe foreign exchange
shortage that forced curtailment  of imports and shortages of essentials.
Political instability increased along with economic  instability  during the late 1970s.
Political violence, already serious, worsened in the course of 1979. A series of coalition
governments had failed to stabilize the economy, much less to adopt the reforms required to
avert a crisis.  Turkey had an IMF program in 1978, which was canceled because lack of
fundamental  reforms made the program go off track.  Another IMF program, negotiated  in
summer 1979 by the left center government of social democrat Bulent Ecevit, was well on its
way to a similar fate by the end of the year (Okyar 1983). At the beginning of 1980, Turkey
was unable to import the essentials  for winter survival -- oil, coal, and coffee.  Many homes
and government  buildings went without heat in that exceptionally  cold winter.
In November 1979, a right-center  coalition  headed by Suleyman  Demirel had taken
over and brought in a new economic  team, led by Turgut Ozal.  To end the crisis, the
government introduced  a major package of adjustment measures  in January 1980. Initially it
mainly addressed the debt crisis and balance of payments  problem, but it started thePolitical Economy  of Policy  Reform in Turkey  5
wholesale reorientation  of policy toward a market-based  economy. Strikes and political
violence continued through the summer, aggravated in part by the economic dislocation
originating from the adjustment.
Military interregnum
The military took over in September 1980. They dissolved parliament, outlawed
political parties and radical unions, arrested  political ieaders  -- executed some -- and
suspended many political and human rights.  The military kept Ozal as head of the economic
team.  Structural adjustment  continued under military leadership, although they did not
traditionally  favor open trade and market-oriented  economic  policies.  The military was
divided over Ozal's plans to reduce the role of the state in running the economy, but they
could not argue with his success in stimulating  exports and in securing foreign financing.
In June 1982, the Banker's Crisis, in which Turkey's largest money broker and
securities house collapsed, led to Ozal's resignation  and replacement  by Turgut Sunalp, a
military man with a more traditional  etatist orientation.  In the remaining  year of military
government,  policy deteriorated in terms of budget deficits and exchange rate overvaluation.
The episode illustrates  that the military was not the primary force behind the policy reform
movement  and that it followed  policies that would sustain its popularity in the short run.
The military had anticipated that it would have 5 or 6 years to restore political and
macroeconomic  stability, but they had less.  In the tradition of previous military
interventions, all sides accepted that the military rule would be temporary.  Once the political
violence was stopped, public opinion from all but the extreme right called for a return to
democracy. The Europeans  and Americans also wanted a return to democracy, and U.S.
Secretary of State Al Haig pressed the issue in his visit to Turkey in 198x.
Initiating democracy
In November 1982, a new constitution  was adopted by referendum and a year later
the military permitted elections. There were strict limits on party participation, and only
three parties were allowed to contest the election. The newly formed Motherland Party
(ANAP), led by Ozal, won the election, defeating  the parties endorsed by the military, and
took power.  The rest of the 1980s witnessed  a series of elections that broadened the scope
of democratic control and participation. The public position of the party and the government
was always that economic reform and political liberalization  were on the agenda, and reforms
on one front or another continued through the 1980s. On the other hand, there were also
important delays and reversals of reform, especially  on the fiscal reform, bank restructuring,
and SEE privatization.
Turkey constitutes  a unique  case of structural adjustment in terms of the continuity of
leadership.  Ttirgut Ozal reemerged in a new guise following  the general elections of
November 1983, this time as the Prime Minister of a democratically  elected government.6  Political  Economy  of Policy  Reform in Turkey
What came to be the ruling ANAP party (Motherland  Party) was centered around the core
team that had designed and initiated  the structural adjustment  program.  A key part of
ANAP's political appeal was the success  of the economic  program.  Although the party made
appeals in other dimensions  as well -- some distance from the military, more distance from
the left, some association with Islamic fundamentalism,  and some appeals to Turkish
nationalism  -- it repeatedly campaigned  as if in a referendum on the economic  program.
The new government used the political  honeymoon  following  the resumption  of
elected government  to put through  a second wave of economic reforms, especially of the
import regime and the capital account in December 1983 and January 1984. Soon after came
a series of measures  to liberalize  the foreign investment  regime.  ANAP's popularity was
bolstered by its reputation for reform and the high rates of economic  growth in the mid-
1980s, which contrasted with the dismal performance  of the economy  at the peak of the
crisis.  The obvious pre-1980 heritage of the two main opposition  parties was an advantage
for the ANAP governments,  especially during the early years of its existence.  ANAP could
portray itself as the party of the new era, while projecting  the opposition  parties as
institutions  of an old order that had ended in abject failure.
In 1985, when it was time to name a new chief of staff of the military, the old chief
nominated  his successor as was the custom.  Ozal rejected the nominee, however, and chose
someone else.  This was significant  in two ways.  First, it demonstrated  an unprecedented
degree of civilian control over the military and signalled  that the military could not threaten
another takeover.  Second, whereas the original nominee, like his predecessor, was from the
branch of the military that favored etatist economic  policy, Ozal choose a general who was
ready to accept the need to move to an open, market-oriented  economy.
Completing  democratization
Although the resumption  of democracy  started with the general elections of November
1983, freely competitive  politics in Turkey resumed only in 1987.  Leading  politicians of the
pre-1980 period, notably, Demirel  and Ecevit, were permitted to contest the elections of
November 1987, after a ten-year ban by the military on their participation in politics was
lifted by the referendum  of September 1987. After that point, Ozal increasingly  diverted his
attention from economic policy toward purely political issues.
The general election in 1987 proved to be a turning point in the fortunes of both the
ANAP government  and the structural adjustment  process.  In spite of a decisive victory in
the general elections of 1987, the further opening up of the political system presented ANAP
with a novel set of challenges, which were largely absent in the preceding era -- the public
reappearance  of the key political figures of the pre-1980 order and the reemergence  of
distributional  pressures, particularly  involving wages  and agricultural subsidies.  The
problem of macroeconomic  instability  continued and became more severe.Political  Economy  of Policy  Reform in Turkey  7
The popularity of ANAP declined dramatically  in the eighteen months after its victory
in the general election of November 1987. The municipal  elections of March 1989 proved to
be a turning point, with ANAP emerging as the third patty, with a mere 22 percent of the
vote.  The party never fully recovered.  In 1989  Ozal had himself elected to the presidency
(by the ANAP dominated  parliament), and in accordance  with the constitution, he had to
resign from the party.  He still tried to run the party and the government unofficially,
through his successor Yildirim  Akbulut, but his move upward left a leadership vacuum in the
ANAP government  and allowed infighting  between key policy makers.  Ozal's election to the
presidency undermined  the legitimacy  of the government;  opposition leaders, whose parties
had strong support in the most recent elections and polls, claimed that Ozal did not have a
mandate to assume the presidency since ANAP had received only 21 percent of the vote in
the municipal  elections. The problems with internal coordination  and domestic legitimacy
both weakened the implementation  of the structural adjustment  program.  Fiscal instability
and chronically  high inflation  contributed to the loss of popularity  of ANAP in the late
1980s. Despite some improvement  in its electoral performance  compared to 1989, it lost the
general election of October 1991, which brought  a return of coalition politics to Turkey and
the beginning  of a new era, following  eight years of uninterrupted  ANAP rule and eleven
years during which Ozal dominated  economic  policy.
Agriculture and labor were the principal losers of the structural adjustment  process,
and these two groups determined  the outcome of the 1991 election. They were the principal
bases of support for the two parties that became the ruling coalition  partners in November
1991 -- the True Path Party (DYP) and the Social Democratic  Populist Party (SHP).
B.  INSTITUTIONAL  STRUCTURE  AND CHANGE
Before turning to a detailed chronology  of the trade and macroeconomic  policies in
the periods outlined above, we must examine the formal and informal institutions  of decision
making, which have received relatively  little attention in previous studies of Turkish political
economy.  I
Although  the structural adjustment  process in Turkey in the 1980s was closely
associated with the personality of Ozal, the political  and bureaucratic institutions  and changes
to them were also important. He often took the initiative in restructuring  institutions,  and the
nature of these changes affected the course of the structural adjustment. The institutional
side of the story is especially important for the World Bank, because the experience with
inst'itional  innovation  is most likely to be relevant for other countries seeking to replicate
Tur&y's  successes  while avoiding the pitfalls.
1. Celasun  and Rodrik 1989; Keyder 1987; Krueger and Turan 1992; Oniq and Riedel 1992; Waterbury  1992; Aricanli and
Rodrik,  cd., 1990.8  Political  Economy  of Policy  Reform  in Turkey
Formal and informal  constitution
The transition to democracy involves changes in the formal constitution  of political
decision making, but the meaning  of the legal document depends on the political culture that
is inherited from the past and on the interpretation  of the constitution  as it is put into
practice.  The following  section lays out a few features of political culture and constitution
that are most relevant for economic  policy.
Political culture
A strong patrimonial  state tradition, which dates back to the pre-Republican  Ottoman
period, remains a key element of Turkey's political culture (Heper, 1985; Mardin, 1973).
Central to this tradition is the idea that the state is a provider, an institution  to guarantee the
livelihood  of broad strata of the population  in a hierarchically  organized society.  The
popular notion of the father state ("papa-state") symbolizes  the idea of the state as the
provider in the Turkish society.  For lower-income  groups, a major form of provision
involves employment  opportunities  within the large public sector.  For business groups,
entrepreneurs or producers, state provision takes the form of a wide variety of subsidies. At
the Third Izmir Congress on the Turkish Economy in 1992, the founder  and head of
Turkey's largest industrial group, Vehbi Koc, credited the success of his firm and others like
it, not to the energy and skill of the entrepreneurs, but rather to the support of the state.
A counterpart to the strong patrimonial state tradition in Turkey is the weakness  of
the civil society, as manifest by the weakness  of autonomous  interest associations. The
strong state-weak  civil society dichotomy  (or strong center versus weak periphery) has the
result that the Turkish state elites (politicians  and bureaucrats)  will not enter into
institutionalized  contact or dialogue with interest organizations,  concerning  policy formation
and implementation. The weakness  of institutionalized  links with formal interest associations
encourages the development  of extensive patron-client  networks and leads, under the
constraints of parliamentary  democracy, to attempts to build up popular support through the
dispersion  of patronage resources on a large scale.
This tradition had two effects on the structural adjustment  process:  A highly
centralized and insulated state apparatus  helped to initiate stabilization  and structural
adjustment  and to maintain  the momentum  of the process during its early stages.  However,
the absence of strong formal lin: s with interest associations  or organized groups in civil
society proved to be a disadvantage  during the later states of structural adjustment, when the
problem became one of consolidating,  institutionalizing,  and maintaining  the momentum  of
the reform process, and particularly when consolidation  of democracy itself was emerging as
an overriding objective.  Although  the paternalistic  political  culture has continued in Turkey,
civil society has strengthened  somewhat  since 1983, and developments  such as reduced
tolerance for corruption signal the rise of an alternate, more modern political  culture.Political Economny  of Policy Reform in Turkey  9
Electoral and constitutional  changes
The Turkish constitution  of 1982 set up a government  with a president, prime
minister, cabinet, and parliament. Compared to the typical European parliamentary system,
the Turkish president and prime minister had slightly more power on paper relative to the
other parts of government, and considerably  more in practice.  The process of
democratization  was controlled from above and was phased in two senses.  At first General
Erven, who had led the military takeover, remained  president, and then in 1989 the
parliament elected 6zal,  the head of the ruling party, to be president.  Also, the participation
of parties and of former politicians was severely circumscribed  in 1983, and only since 1987
has a broad spectrum of parties been able to participate fully in elections and parliament.
Parties based on economic  groups, regions, and ethnicity (eg. Kurdish) were expressly
forbidden.
The electoral svstem, first used in 1983 and modified  just before the elections of
1987, was consciously  designed to eliminate minor parties, especially  regional ones, and
consequently  to avoid the instability  associated  with coalition  governments  in the late 1970s.
The problem of an excessive number of parties was tackled directly by the military in the
context of the 1983 elections in the sense that only three parties (ANAP, MDP, and MP)
were allowed to contest the elections.  In the 1987 and 1991 general elections, however, the
multiple-member  constituency  electoral system was the key indirect instrument that
effectively  excluded minor parties from representation. A party had to pass both a national
threshold  of 10 percent and local threshold  that depended on the nature of the electoral
district.  A party which failed to satisfy the national requirement  was automatically  barred
from returning deputies anywhere, regardless of its performance  in a particular electoral
district.  Minor parties were particuiarly  disadvantaged  in small electoral districts. 2
In 1987, the four minor parties in total received 19 percent of the vote, yet they could
not elect any deputies.  The presence of the minor parties had one significant  impact,
however, in terms of changing the balance from the two major opposition  parties to the
governing party.  The electoral system enabled  ANAP to secure a narrow electoral coalition
whereby the party managed to claim two thirds of the seats in parliament with only 36
percent of total vote.
2. Local thresholds arc determined  by dividing the total number of votes in the constituency by the total number of seats
allocated to the constituency.  The local threshold therefore  varies,  from a minimum of 20 percent in the largcst 48
constitucncies with six seats cach (also in districts with five seats) to a maximum of 50 percent in the constituencies with
only two seats each.  Furthcrmore.  in 46 constituencics only one member is elected on the basis of simple majori.-:, which
also hinders small parties.10  Political  Econony of Policy  Reform in Turkey
Rule by Decree and Role of Parliament
The military interlude and the constitution  of 1982, which set the terms for returning
to democracy, concentrated  power at the center.  The new constitutional  order strengthened
the executive  power at the expense of the legislature, and centralized power within the
executive with a corresponding  decline of the cabinet as decision-making  entity.  The strong-
executive/weak-parliament  dichotomy  continued after the re-establishment  of democracy in
1983. A central feature of the ANAP governments  was a highly concentrated  decision-
making structure, with the responsibility  for key economic  decisions  being confined  to the
Prime Minister, an inner or core cabinet and a small group of top-level bureaucrats. The
dominance  of the executive over the Parliament and even over the non-core cabinet was
reflected by the emergence of government  decrees as the major instrument for introducing
policy changes during the period.  The dominance  of government  decrees was justified on the
grounds that they offered flexibility  and could introduce  decisions rapidly without
unnecessary  delays or inertia.  Yet, the reliance on government  decrees rather than
legislation  often led to more arbitrary decision making. Government  decrees frequently
changed policy and caused uncertainty  on the part of economic  agents, leading to shorter
investment  horizons and reducing the credibility of the adjustment  measures.
Political  parties
The military outlawed  all political  parties when it took over in 1980. When
democracy returned in 1983, all the parties had to have new names, and they were not
allowed to have any explicit links to economic  interest groups or regions.  To some extent
old wine ended up in bottles very similar to the old ones, except for the labels.  But there
were a few major realignments,  and the economic  platforms were all substantially  different,
because the structural adjustment  experience had fundamentally  changed the issues of debate
on economic policy.
Motherland Party
The support base of the Motherland  Party (ANAP) is predominantly  urban, from
groups other than unionized workers, as an examination  of the distribution  of votes by
provinces  during the general elections of 1991  reveals.  ANAP's best performance  was
registered in Istanbul, where the party won 33 out of fifty seats (with DYP and SHP gaining
a mere five seats each).  In Izmir and Ankara, ANAP also did well, but by smaller margins.
Among the major urban centers, Adana was the only one where ANAP lost -- not surprising
given its agricultural hinterland. The pro-urban character of ANAP is also confirmed by its
good record in the comparatively  prosperous provinces  of the Aegean region in the West.
ANAP started as a coalition, with a liberal wing and a conservative  wing.  Religion
was important for securing the loyalty of the conservative  faction and in holding the basic
coalition  together.  Ozal himself was closely associated  with the Islamic fundamentalist  party
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Table 2:  Results  of the Major National  and Municipal  Elections
1983-1991
General Elections  General Elections  Municipal Elections  General Elections
of November  1983  of November 1987  of March 1989  of  October 1991
Share of  Share of  Share of
Share of  Seats in  Share of  Seats in  Share of  Share of  seats in
vote (70)  parliament  (%)  vote (%)  parliament  (%)  vote (%)  vote (%)  parliament  (%)
ANAP  45  53  36  66  22  :2426
HP  31  29  --  --  --  --
SHP  --  --  25  22  29  2120
DYP  --  --  19  12  25  2740
DSP  --  --  9  --  9  112
MqP  --  --  3  --  4  ----
MDP  23  18  --  --  ----
RP  --  --  7  --  10  1714
DP  --  --  0.8  --  0.9  ----
SP  --  --  0.4--
Independents  I  --  0.5  --  0.6  0.1--
lNotes:  Results of the 1984 municipal elections are not inclhded because they are broadly parallel to the outcome of the preceding  national elections.  ANAP (Motherland Party);
HP (Populist Party); SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party); DYP (True Path Party); DSP (Demnocratic  Left Party); M('P  (Nationalist Work Party); MDP  (National
Democracy Party); RP (Prosperity Party); DP (Reformist Democracy Party); SP (Socialist Parry).12  Political Economy of Policy Reform  in Turkey
older brother is a well-known  religious  leader.  Thus, ANAP had a widespread  appeal in the
1980s  because it managed to  represented a mixture of neo-liberal and Islamic ideologies,
and did not have to choose between them.
In the elections of 1991, ANAP lost some of its support to the Welfare Party (RP),
with a strong Islamic orientation. RP consolidated  its position particularly in the districts of
the Inner Anatolia region.  ANAP increasingly  shed its religious  or conservative  components
under a new leadership  in the beginning  of the 1990s. Consequently, the party emerged in
the election of 1991 with a more homogenous  outlook as an urban-centered  and secular
party, committed to the neo-liberal model -- hence, a party conceived as an attractive choice
for the relatively prosperous strata, the managerial  and business elites.  Yet, the result was a
transition from a broad-based  national  party, with some urban bias, to a party with a much
diminished  electoral base.
The change of ANAP's electoral base followed  after major losses in the municipal
elections of March 1989. Compared to the 1987  election, the losses were particularly
pronounced in the urban centers (Cakmak, 1990). ANAP confronted SHP in the urban
centers during the 1980s, whereas the competition  with DYP has been in rural areas.
How do we explain ANAP's electoral success in the 1980s, particularly considering
that the structural adjustment program generated  intense distributional problems? At least
well into 1990, the electoral fortunes of ANAP were closely tied to the popularity  and the
performance  of its leader.  Ozal played a major role in the success of ANAP between 1983
and 1987. He portrayed himself as a leader with influence  abroad, boosting the foreign
image of Turkey, and as the architect of the new program for economic recovery.  Equally
striking was his ability to portray the crisis of the late 1970s, the most acute crisis in recent
Turkish history, as the failure of the opposition.  He was able to project ANAP as a new
party of the 1980s, with a novel economic  program, whereas other parties represented  a
continuation  of the pre-1980 politics whose policies  had already been tried and had ended in
object failure.  Ozal bolstered his position as the leader of the party by keeping tight party
discipline, choosing candidates  and dispensing  with those who deviated from the party line.
It might appear paradoxical to view ANAP as a party of the new era, given that it
was one of the three parties allowed by the military to contest the general elections of
November 1983 as part of the top-down  process of gradual political liberalization. ANAP
was not, however, the party that the top military leadership  wished to see in government
after the 1983 elections. The military implicitly  backed the National Democracy Party
(MCP) headed by an ex-general, Sunalp.  Part of ANAP's unexpected  success in 1983
derived from being the party that dissociated  itself most from the military. It also helped that
Ozal had been out of office since the Banker's Crisis of June 1982.
The economic reforms evoked general electoral appreciation for ANAP, while at the
same time unreformed aspects of economic  policy were increasingly  involved  in the
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traditional, dating from Justice Party governments in the pre-1980 period.  Although  left and
left-center  govemments also used such networks, the right of center governments  tended to
rely on them more, going back to the 1950s. (Tne left-center  governments were in power
less of the time and relied more on direct redistributive measures.)  The electorate  expected
disproportionate  benefits to be derived from close association with the top leadership  and its
close proximity to patronage resources.  For example, ANAP did well around Malatya,
Ozal's home town, and in the provinces in the East Coast of the Black Sea Region, from
where Mesut Yilmaz came, the party leader in 1990-91. Employment  opportunities  in the
public enterprise sector and bureaucracy were the traditional  avenues for patronage, and
Turkey's public sector remained  largely intact throughout the 1980s.
Also important were the distribution  of credits by public banks and frequent rescue
operations for troubled private firms.  The public sector continued to dominate  the financial
system throughout the 1980s and, in fact, public banks' share of total bank credits has
expanded  during the period.  Lucrative public sector contracts and preferential access to SEE
output, being sold at prices that had lagged  behind inflation, constituted  other avenues
whereby firms favored by the government  could benefit in return for political support.
Two new means of disposing  patronage emerged during the 1980s -- the extra
budgetary funds and the local budgets.  EBFs clearly provided an important avenue for
ANAP govemments to direct public expenditures  to specific  groups or regions with the
explicit objective of constructing electoral support.  Yet another major avenue concerned the
increasingly  important role played by the local authorities, which employed an extension  of
their power under the ANAP rule, in dispensing  the patronage resources.  A key instrument
for this purpose was issuance of construction  licenses, the responsibility  for which was
transferred to the local authorities under ANAP rule.
ANAP's success also derived from the relative weakness  of the opposition. The
opposition parties in Turkey suffered from having much less access to state resources than
the governing party.  Through control of the large public sector, the governing party could
use patronage to augment its electoral base.  The weakness of the opposition  parties during
most of the 1980s, however, was not due primarily to a weak financial  base but rather to
their inability to formulate  a coherent and convincing  alternative to the government's
economic program.
Finally, part of ANAP's success ought to be traced to the electoral laws described
above.  This was particularly true in the 1987 elections, where the party increased its share
of seats in the parliament while experiencing  a declining share of the national vote.
Opposition  Parties
After the transition back to democracy started in 1983, there were two major
opposition  parties: The Social Democratic  Populist Party (SHP) and the True Path Party
(DYP).  They are direct descendants  of the two principal political narties of the pre-198014  Political  Economy  of Policy  Refonn  in Turkey
era.  SHP may be regarded as the reincarnation  of the Republican People's Party (CHP)
which dates back to the very beginning  of the Republic  in  1923. CHP had been the
dominant institution  in the single party era until the inception  of multi-party  democracy in
1950. Subsequently,  CHP converted into center-left social democratic  party in the late 1960.
Shortly after the Nov. 1983 election, the Populist Party (HP) merged with the Social
Democratic  Party (SODEP), excluded from the election, to become the Social Democratic
Populist Party (SHP), which contested the municipal  elections in March 1984 and became the
principal center-left  party in the 1980s. Compared with the Populist Party, the SHP was a
more typical social democratic  party in its pro-labor objectives  and electoral base.
After 1983, with no more limit on the number of parties in the elections, several new
parties emerged.  Ecevit (initially  acting through his wife) started another socialist  party, the
Social Democratic  Party (DSP), as a vehicle for his return to political life, because he did
not regard SHP as a true social democratic  party.  The Welfare Party (RP) also formed as a
reincarnation  of the National Salvation Party (MSP), representing Islamic fundamentalism.
During the post-1983 period, SHP drew its support primarily from urban wage
earners and lower- and middle-level  public sector employees.  Although  SHP was the main
political  outlet for wage earners and lower-income  groups, the links with the union
movement  remained  weak in the post-1983  era.  This was mostly due to constitutional
restrictions  on the interaction  between political parties and interest associations.  But, it was
also partly due to the failure of the party itself to make even, particularly toward the end of
the decade. The party remained the principal opposition  party until the elections of
November 1991. For most of the decade, redistribution  in favor of lower-income  groups
constituted  the focal point of the party's economic  program.  Important elements of the
party's "etatist" heritage remained intact throughout  the 1980s.
In the municipal  elections of March 1989, the social democrats strongly increased
their vote share nationwide  and won most of the key municipalities. Ironically, ANAP's
partial recovery during the general elections of 1991 has been a predominantly  urban
phenomenon  and has occurred at the expense of the social democrats.  This may be explained
by factors which are independent  of the process of structural adjustment. The social
democrats remained deeply divided -- into two parties (SHP and DSP) and into factions
within SHP.  In addition to internal conflicts, the weakness of the left was accentuated  by its
almost exclusive focus on redistribution, with no serious discussion of how a major
redistribution  program would be compatible  with an acceptable rate of economic  growth or
accumulation. Consequently,  the social democrats  could not come up with an economic
program which would allow them to win an outright majority. The international  climate,
with market-oriented  reforms representing  an almost universal phenomenon,  also operated to
the left's disadvantage.
Undoubtedly, a major contributor  to the sharp decline in SHP's popularity was the
poor performance  of its municipal  governments  during the 1989-1991  period, partly because
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tendency of the ANAP government to offer less funding  to SHP-run cities.  Also the DYP
offered a populist but less ideological  alternative, which gained them votes in a number of
traditional strongholds  of the SHP.
The True Path Party (DYP) was the clear successor to the Justice Party, the
principal center-right  party of the pre-1980 era.  Demirel led the Justice Party with a
charismatic style up to September 1980 and resumed leadership  to the DYP after the
referendum in 1987. The True Path Party drew its support primarily from the rural areas
and small business.  Rural support proved to be a considerable  asset, given that more than
forty percent of the population  in Turkey is still in rural areas and employed in agriculture,
although the sector's share in value added is considerably  lower.  The vote of the agricultural
regions was decisive for DYP's emergence as the leading party in 1991.  Both SHP and DYP
differ from ANAP in their explicit concern with income distribution and the position of
lower-income  groups.
While the major parties had converged on most key aspects of the structural
adjustment  program by the early 1990s, important differences  between ANAP and the other
parties remained. There was a consensus  on the irreversibility  of trade and capital account
liberalization  as well as on the importance  of the key institutions  of the neo-liberal model,
such as the capital market and the foreign exchange market. There was not, however, a
similar consensus  concerning reform of the public sector, with both SHP and DYP being less
disposed to privatization  than ANAP, although  the latter certainly did not move quickly on
the issue either.
Interest groups
Compared with corporatism in Western Europe, the peak interest associations  in
Turkey contributed little to policy formation and implementation  in the 1980s. The
insulation  of the executive policy-making  elite from societal and interest group pressures
proved to be a decisive advantage for initiating  and implementing  the early phases of
structural adjustment  program.  Yet, as the restoration  of democracy brought new
distributional  claims into the picture in the latter half of the 1980s, the pattern of insulated
decision making increasingly  became a disadvantage  for sustaining  macroeconomic  discipline
and the overall momentum  of the program.
Business  associations
Institutionalized  business associations  made only limited contributions  to the
formulation  and implementation  of structural adjustment  policies  in the 1980s, in spite of the
privileged  position of private business.
The interaction between government  and business occurred mainly at a personal level,
involving  direct contacts between key businessmen,  on the one hand, and the Prime Minister
plus a small core of Ministers and top-level bureaucrats, on the other (Heper 1991; Bugra,16  Political  Economy  of Policy  Reform  in Turkey
1991).  Contact  between business and government  became more prevalent in the late 1980s,
as senior official and sometimes  Ozal himself attended meetings  of the Political Science
Graduates Association  of Istanbul and the Taksim Round Table discussions, open to all
businessmen,  for something  like $500 per place.  Also, by the late 1980s, the young business
leaders of TUSIAD were meeting regularly with senior bureaucrats at Treasury and the
Central Bank, to discuss a variety of broad policy issues. 3 The contacts did not go farther
and become part of the official decision process, however, partly because of restrictions
imposed on interest group activity by the Constitution  of 1982, but also because of Turkey's
paternalistic state tradition, with a strong center confronting  a weakly organized periphery
and civil society (Ozbudun, 1991; Mardin, 1973; Heper, 1985). In the early 1990s, business
leaders still complained  that important policy measures  would be announced without prior
consultation  and certainly without  bargaining and reaching an agreement with organized
interest group representatives. 4
The Turkish business associations  have weak organizations,  reflecting the fragmented
nature of the business community  itself.  The two main organizations, TOBB (The National
Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry)  and TuSIAD (The Turkish Industrialists' and
Businessmen's  Association),  reflect the divisions and conflicts within the business
community. TOBB, with a total of 687,000 members  drawn from all parts of the country,
regards itself as the sole I g.timate representative  of business interests and opinion.  It bases
the claim on the size and nature of its membership,  which is compulsory  for all firms.  By
weight of their numbers, small Anatolian businessmen  dominate  TOBB.  By contrast
TuSIAD, comprises only the elite of the business community,  namely the large-scale
conglomerates  located almost exclusively  in the Istanbul area.
Neither institution adequately  represents the varied interests of the business
community. For TOBB the problems  are, first, that it is too all encompassing  to have a
well-defined  interest and, second, that the government  finances and dominates  its leadership.
In practice, the government uses TOBB as an instrument  to divide and rule business and as a
source of statements  of business support for government  policies.  TuSIAD, in contrast, is a
voluntary association  and thus required by law to act in the general public interest.  TuSIAD
lacks the unifying purpose of a true interest-group  organization  and does not lobby for its
members interests, both because of the law and the free-rider problem discussed  below.
Given the one-member/one-vote  system in TOBB  elections, the TuSIAD members, which
economically  dominate their industries, are unable to exercise corresponding  influence  in
TOBB.  Furthermore, the majority of TOBB membership  exercises a close surveillance  over
TOBB's relations with TaStAD, which seriously  constrains the development  of a closer
relationship  between the two organizations  (Arat 1991; Ozbudun, 1991; interview with
Ucer).
3. Intcrvicws  with N. Akturk, E. Kumcu.
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The conflict between TOBB and TuStAD illustrates the fragmented nature of business
representation  in Turkey.  Yet, the line of cleavage is not simply along the lines of small
versus large business.  Important conflicts of interest have arisen within the community of
large-scale conglomerates, which TuSIAD represents, particularly between outward-oriented
firms and those with a predominantly  inward orientatioi'.  This conflict has manifest itself
particularly in the textile sector -- imports of raw materials (yarn and fiber) versus exports of
clothing.
Large family-controlled  conglomerate  firms play a leading role manufacturing  in
Turkey, producing both exports and import-competing  goods and owning banks.  Often their
shift from import competing to export involved mainly a transition to higher quality lines of
production, which firms were glad to make.  Most of the manufacturing  production before
1980 went to the heavily protected  domestic market.  By the late 1970s, however, many
firms saw that the import-substituting  model had become unsustainable,  and they began to
support more export-oriented  policies.
The perception of business associations  by the bureaucracy  and politicians  also
weakened  the influence of the associations  on the policy process in the 1980s.  Both
businessmen  and bureaucrats are fully aware of the fragmented  nature of the business
community  and its principal interest organizations. 5 Consequently, the top bureaucrats do
not regard the business associations  as a united front representing their members' interests
and do not enter into institutionalized  dialogue with the organizations. This process, in turn,
encourages the individualized  contact between businessmen,  bureaucrats and politicians.
This represents a free-rider problem, because no one wants to bear the cost of starting
to improve things, even though most of them would accept the benefits.  At any point in
time, key members of each group are getting advantages  from the system of individualized
contacts -- businessmen  get favors, bureaucrats get options for mobility into top private-
sector  jobs, and politicians get political support and freedom from having to deal with a
unified and powerful business lobby.  For the economy as a whole, the cost is unsystematic
and unpredictable  policy and the encouragement  of rent-seeking. The compensating  benefits
of a more rational system, however, would materialize  only in the long-run, and only if all
participants  gave up rights of individual  access.  Realizing  this would require strong,
encompassing  interest associations  that could discourage their members from trying to act
independently  (Olson, 1965, 1982).
At the micro-level, the Special Sectoral Committees  (Ozel Ihtisas Komisyonlari)  could
have become a key form in the 1980s for institutionalizing  discussion of government-business
relations, but did not.  The committees, with representatives  of state agencies, the business
community  and academia, had been important  for discussion  and providing information  input
into SPO's five year plans in the pre-1980 era.  These micro-level  committees  continued to
exist in the 1980s -- 120 of them for the sixth five-year development  plan, which extends into
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the mid-1990s  -- but their importance  declined as the five-year plans themselves were
marginalized  during the 1980s. The committee reports are useful in identifying the
development  trends and prospects in the relevant sectors or sub-sectors, but are weak in
terms of actual policy recommendations  because their scope remains micro sectoral.  The
major firms with political clout do not bother with the committees, because they have direct
access to the politicians who make the final decisions.
Labor
As of the late 1970s  Turkey had two main labor organizations  -- the Confederation  of
Labor Unions  in Turkey (Turk-is), the larger of the two, and the Confederation  of
Revolutionary  Labor Unions (DISK), the more leftist and confrontational. The latter had
been achieving  large wage gains and organizing mass demonstrations  in the big cities,
thereby gaining size and influence.
The military regime, as soon as it took over, banned strikes and suspended collective
bargaining  over wages.  It outlawed DISK and jailed its leaders.  Turk-is remained in
existence, but with much reduced opportunities  for representing  the interests of labor.
The military government created new labor institutions  to replace those it destroyed  or
weakened. It set up a council of arbitration to settle wage disputes, which repeatedly gave
nominal wages increases below the previous and future inflation rates.  The government
wanted cheap labor but not unemployment,  which would have increased political unrest, so it
required employers to agree not to lay off workers.  This may have acted to some extent as a
disincentive  for firms to hire new workers; and unemployment  did remain a problem through
much of the 1980s.  Nonetheless,  it was widely believed that the arrangement prevented
unemployment  from being worse than otherwise.  From the point of view of those already
employed and in the labor movement,  it almost certainly was true.  In other words, the
government protected some elements of wage labor, namely those that would have been laid
off, at the expense of those that would have kept their jobs even with high real wages.
Thus, the government  displaced and to a limited extent replaced unions as arbiters and
representatives  of labor interest.
When the military government  wrote the new constitution  in 1982, laying down the
terms for a return to democracy, it perpetuated  the reduced status of unions.  Labor unions,
like other interest groups, were not allowed to have any direct connection  with political
parties.  Unlike businessmen,  workers had virtually no personal connections  with the political
elite.
The ANAP government in the mid 80s did little to relax the inhibitions  on union
power.  The persecution  of labor leaders virtually stopped, but it had in any case become
unnecessary  for curtailing union power, at least in the short run.  All strikes were outlawed
until 1987, and they are still banned in the financial  and public sectors.  Binding arbitration
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None of the three parties permitted in the 1983 election represented labor interests in
the formal sense of consulting with labor unions in developing  their economic  programs, but
the Populist Party (HP) made electoral appeals to the economic  interests of wage labor.  The
Social Democratic  Populist Party (SHP), which became the principal center-left party in the
1980s, was a more typical social democratic party in its pro-labor objectives  and electoral
base.
Three characteristics  of labor unions in Turkey precluded labor in the 1980s, or
before, from becoming an active party to a tripartite corporatist agreement, with the state and
private business.  First, TOrk-is  has a weak organization  and lacks technical  capacity and
research infrastructures. Furthermore, labor unions in Turkey have a low status in Turkish
society, compared with German unions, for example. They lack the technical base, the
vision of longer-term  interest, and the self-confidence  required for effective participation  in
economic decision making at the national level.  Second, collective  bargaining  in Turkey has
been organized at the level of industrial sectors; consequently  sectoral unions are key actors
involved in the wage bargaining  process.  While Turk-is plays a coordinating role, its ability
as a peak association  to control and discipline  individual  sectoral labor unions is rather
limited.  Hence, even if Turk-is were to become a member  of a corporatist general council
for economic policy making, this membership  would not necessarily contribute to greater
coordination  of the economy, since Turk-is would have little power to make its constituent
unions conform to the council's decisions. In the medium or long run, however, the
formation of such a Council with labor could contribute  towards a learning process, whereby
union leaders would become increasingly  aware that they could play a novel social role.  The
requirement of effective  participation in the corporatist council could act as an top-down
incentive for the reorganization and reconstitution  of union activity away from decentralized
wage bargaining, toward bargaining in the context of national goals, which would be in the
union's long term interest.
Finally, the negative experience of labor in the 1980s  was and remains an obstacle to
the incorporation  of labor into a corporatist framework. The direct exclusion of labor during
the early parts of the decade undermined  trust in the value of co-operation  and
institutionalized  bargaining with other key actors.  Labor declined participation  in corporatist
institutions, because they conceive such organizations  as a means of imposing labor discipline
per se, without parallel sacrifices incurred by other social groups.
The various phases of industrial labor relations in Turkey in the 1980s all support the
hypothesis that either direct exclusion  of labor from the policy process or its inclusion
through corporatist agreements facilitates structural adjustment, but intermediate
arrangements lead to problems.  Prior to the military takeover in September 1980, labor
unions were strong in their ability to bargain with employers, including  the government, but
they were excluded from the policy making process after the right-center  Justice Party
replaced the Social Democrats in November 1979. The Turkish government  chose direct
exclusion of labor in the early 1980s. The resultant flexibility of real wages downward
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stimulated Turkey's export.  After 1987 the direct exclusion ended, but no inclusive
corporatist  arrangement took its place.  The resultant intermediate regime contributed to
macroeconomic  instability.
Agriculture
Most agricultural producers lost during the structural adjustment  process of the 1980s.
A key component  of the structural adjustment program which directly affected the
agricultural sector and the rural community  (constituting  more than forty percent of the labor
force) concerned  the significant  reduction in subsidies  provided to the sector through high
support prices.  The decline in subsidies involved  both the magnitude  of support prices and
the number of commodities  covered (Olgun 1991). The share of national income going to
agriculture declined from 25.5 percent in 1978-79  to 20.5 percent by 1984-85  and to 18.3
percent in 1989-90 (Ozmucur 1991).
The principal organization  representing agricultural  interests was the Turkish Union of
Chambers of Agriculture (TZOB). The agricultural  community loudly criticized what it
considered to be the obvious pro-urban bias of the ANAP governments. In spite of this
vocal criticism agricultural interests for most of the 1980s could not engineer a decisive shift
in the policy stance of the government  in their favor.  The turning point arrived, however,
with the municipal  elections of March 1989, in which the True Path Party (DYP), a party
with a strong rural base of support, emerged ahead of ANAP as the second major party in
the country.  Thus it was through the party system and electoral competition  rather than
direct interest representation  by the relevant association  that the agricultural sector could
exert an influence  over national  politics (Erguder 1991).
Paternalism  and impotent  interest groups
The prospects for European-style  corporatist intermediation  of interest groups in
Turkey remain limited, at least in the immediate  future.  Corporatist  economic management,
through a general council, for example, would not be feasible  unless the government actively
sought out the views of organized groups for both labor and business. Furthermore, the
ability to secure a corporatist pattern of policy making would require healing the deep
divisions within the business community,  along with a much greater, organizational  capacity
on the part of the peak associations  to discipline  their membership  and to force compliance
with decisions  taken (Onis and Sunar 1992).
Bureaucracy  and Cabinet
Besides  the office of the Prime Minister itself, three institutions  in the central
government were crucial for the structural transformation  of Turkish economic policy in the
1980s -- the State Planning Organization  (SPO), the Undersecretariat  for Treasury and
Foreign Trade (UTFT or just Treasury), and the Central Bank. Other ministries  and the
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installation  of Ozal's choice for chief of staff in 1985, the nilitary stayed out of politics and
did not play any role in economic  policy making.
Restructuring  the bureaucracy
Prior to 1980, the principal agencies for economic  policy were the Ministry of
Finance and Customs, the Ministry of Commerce, and the State Planing Organization. All
three were involved  with trade policy and the allocation  of foreign exchange. The State
Planning Organization  was the premier economic  agency in the 1960s  and 70s.  It produced
the 5-year plans and enforced their implementation. The state-owned  enterprises had to meet
the plan targets, and there were numerous incentives  to pressure private firms to meet them,
especially the SPO's control of import and investment  licenses.  SPO staff believed in the
efficacy of state-led development  and had, accordingly, staked their careers on this
presumption. SPO and the Finance Ministry handled fiscal policy and, through the
subordinated  central bank, monetary  policy as well.  All three agencies were staffed  and
directed predominantly  by persons who believed that state-directed  development  was the most
appropriate for Turkey's circumstances.
Coordination  problems between the economic  ministries date back at least until the
1970s, when Turkey had a series of coalition  governments. At that time each party in the
coalition  got certain ministries, in which it built little patronage empires and carried out
portions of its electoral program. To maintain  some coherence for the government  as a
whole, there had to be coordination  committees  of the relevant ministers in various policy
areas, including  economics. The military and the Ozal governments  continued the tradition.
The Ozal governments undertook  two major reorganizations  of the economic
bureaucracy, in 1983 and 1991, and several minor ones.  The reorganizations  had three
objectives.  One objective was to deal with the coordination  problems mentioned  above.
Second, the political elite and particularly Ozal wanted to have the facility to reward political
friends and punish enemies.  Finally, enacting  and sustaining the reforms required taking
power from the parts of the bureaucracy  epposed Ozal's economic program. These objectives
were not mutually  exclusive, but they did conflict at times.
In the early 1980s the third objective -- taking power from the old, etatist
bureaucrats -- was predominant. The key move that Ozal took in 1983, as soon as he
returned to power, was to create the Undersecretariat  for Treasury and Foreign Trade and to
put it under a new Minister of State for economic  affairs.  This minister was also (although
not permanently) made deputy prime minister, as Ozal had been in 1980-83. Thus, rather
than try to reform the old bureaucrats, he created a new agency and transferred key powers
to it.  The economic team was headed by Ozal, until 1989, and consisted  of the inner cabinet
of four or five politician (and three technocrats)  -- the Undersecretariat  for Treasury and
Foreign Trade, the head of the central bank, and (in a weaker role) the head of SPO.  The
old agencies were left intact but relegated to less crucial functions, such as revenue collection
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head the agencies (Yusuf Ozal at SPO and Pakdemirli at Finance, both in  1987), but they did
not represent the views of their agencies.  They held the positions in order  to be part of the
economic team and,  in effect if not by design, to stop any etatist initiatives from traditional
elements in their agencies.
In the mid and late  1980s, the objective of having facilities for distributing  favors and
punishments became more important because the ANAP government,  initially elected in the
context of a restricted democracy in  1983, faced repeated challenges to its rule as the scope
for democracy was progressively expanded through the remainder of the 1980s.  As
mentioned earlier,  however,  the electoral payoff of this strategy for ANAP was less than
anticipated because the ycung,  internationally oriented businessmen,  who were the
beneficiaries of the structural adjustment program and thus the most natural constituency for
ANAP, were not inclined to make favor-seeking in Ankara the focal point of their
entrepreneurial  efforts.  They were  more frustrated than appeased by the prospect of their
profits depending on shifting decrees.  They preferred a predictable and stable regulatory
environment to getting  favors today that could be taken away tomorrow.6
In the late  1980s coordination problems became more problematic  as Ozal turned his
attention more to politics.  This started in  1987 during the debate over allowing politicians
from the  1970s to return to active political life, and continued when the referendum  approved
their participation.  Ozal's  political involvement increased further after the  1989 municipal
elections, which ANAP lost,  and after  he moved up to the presidency later that year.  In a
reorganization  in June  1991, virtually all economic policy making was put under one
Minister of State for Economy, who was also named Deputy Prime Minister.  Trade,  fiscal
and monetary policy were put under him, along with the State Planning Organization, the
Central Bank, and the major state banks.  This move was certainly not inevitable, indeed it
was hardly anticipated, but it did aim to address a widely recognized problem  in getting the
different  branches of the economic bureaucracy to cooperate.
Professionalization versus Politicization
During the  1980s, attempts have been made to restructure  the bureaucracy and to
institute a managerial bureaucracy involving a top-down approach  (Heper  1990).  The ANAP
governments  sought these changes as a means of securing the smooth implementation of the
structural adjustment program.  The most visible manifestation of this trend has been the
appointment of a select group of young U.S.  educated technocrats,  with a strong commitment
to the neo-liberal model,  to top positions within the economic bureaucracy.  This group,
popularly  known as the Princes, were dependent on and loyal to Ozal and became key
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figures in the implementation  of the economic program during the latter half of the 1980s. 7
This top-down  process of restructuring  often succeeded  in creating nodes of competent
technocrats who could carry out a reform program, when the political leaders wanted it.  As
one would expect, the old-line bureaucrats resented having their traditional  policies rejected
and their career plans thwarted.
Along side the positive trend in the direction of restructuring  the bureaucracy  and
augmenting  its technical  capacity, there was sometimes  a negative counter-trend  of de-
professionalization  of the bureaucracy  at top levels during the 1980s. The erosion occurred
through the expansion  of the domain of political  appointments  into the middie levels (general
manager level).  Promotions  within the agencies became less common. The Central Bank
has avoided this, and so too has the Treasury to some extent.  The growing prevalence of
political appointments  has severely reduced the autonomy  and collective  identity of the
bureaucracy  vis-a-vis the political elites (Heper 1989).
Two institutions  illustrate the extremes of professionalization  and politicization  -- the
Central Bank  and the extra-budgetary  funds, respectively.
C nhral Bank
The Turkish Central Bank has long been part of the bureaucracy, dating back to 1930,
but in the 1980s it underwent  changes that enabled it to play an important role in the
structural adjustment  process.  Since the mid 1980s, the central bank has been the principal
entry point into the government for economists  favoring neo-liberal policies and a base for
disseminating  their policy ideas.  By the end of the 1980s the central bank had the
institutional  capacity, although not always the mandate, to take independent  action that could
influence  policy outcomes.
Prior to 1983, the central bank was effectively  under the Ministry of Finance and had
no autonomy  from it.  With the reorganization  in 1983, the central bank was moved out of
Finance and put under the Minister of State for Economy, to whom the new Treasury
Undersecretariat  also reported.  Yavuz Canevi was named governor, moving  up from being
director of the foreign exchange desk.  Educated  in the Faculty of Political Science at the
University  of Ankara, like most bureaucrats of the time, Canevi had moved  over from the
old Finance Ministry in the late 1970s. Along with him came several other bureaucrats --
such as Zekeriya Yildirim  -- whose key distinction  from the usual type at Finance was that
they also had some foreign graduate training and a command of a foreign language. Canevi
became Undersecretary  of Treasury and Foreign Trade, after Pakdemirli, and Yildirim
became acting governor of the Bank after Canevi's departure.  Eventually,  they moved  out to
7.  Some of the Princes and thcir  followers started out with a degree from the Faculty of Political Science in Ankara - the
cquivalent of the Frcnch Ecolc  Nationalc -- but then went on for a graduate degree in the United States or Europe,  and
perhaps even worked  for a time in the private sector,  before entering the government.  Some of them began their studies at
Bogazici or  METU,  in engineering or economics.24  Political  Economy  of Policy Refonn in Turkey
the private sector, but they did start a tradition at the central bank of intellectual leadership
for the economics  ministry and of an internationalist  orientation.
In 1986, the degree of international  intellectual  influence  at the central bank increased
further with the anival of Rusdu Saracoglu, initially  as director of research, his two
successors in ,hat position, Bulent Gultekin  and Hasan Ersel, and another senior official,
Ercan Kumcu.  All had graduate training in economics  or finance from American or British
universities, and they brought with them a number of young economists  with a similar
background. Rather than emphasizing  legal procedures and lines of authority, like their
predecessors  who only had training as financial  auditors from the political science faculty,
the new economists  emphasized  using a statistical  basis for policy decisions  and evaluating
them in terms of functicnal outcomes.  Saracoglu has moved up to be governor, and
economists  of this new breed have since occupied all the positions  of importance  in the bank.
Gultekin, on leave from the Wharton  Business School, moved  out from the bank to head up
the Public Participation  Fund (an agency for the privatization  of state-owned  enterprises), and
then served as a political advisor to ANAP since returning to Wharton.  Economists  have
otherwise not spread out from the central bank to other agencies within the bureaucracy,
although the relatively high caliber of their analysis and its resonance with work done at the
OECD, IMF, and World Bank has given the central bank a strong voice in discussions  of
macroeconomic  policy (interview  with D. Gokqe).
Although the central bank has remained  within the economics  ministry, it gained some
independence  there, at the price of more dependence  on the prime minister.  The central
bank law of 1970 stipulated  that the governor would be elected by the share holders
(Treasury own 70 percent) for a term of three years, and could be dismissed by the
shareholders, which effectively required a vote of the whole cabinet.  When Saracoglu was
appointed governor in 1987, the term was lengthened  to 5 years, strengthening  his position in
the bureaucracy  and especially  vis a vis Treasury.  Saracoglu's power grew because he
retained the confidence  of Ozal and his designated  successors  in the prime minister's office
and thus outlasted his counterparts at Treasury. 8 Although  Saracoglu and the top officials at
the central bank retained their positions after the change of government  in 1991 -- in contrast
to the complete turnover at the top in Treasury, Finance, and elsewhere -- the way that the
central bank had to increase its monetary  financing for the government in 1992 indicated  the
limits of its autonomy.
Extra Budgetary Funds:  The Sorcerer's Apprentices
From the point of view of sustaining  structural adjustment, the proliferation of the
Extra Budgetary  Funds was the biggest organizational  mistake  of the 1980s. Prior to 1980,
there were 33 funds, all small and some dating back to the 1940s, but 24 were added in
1980-83  and 48 more in 1984-90.  The largest funds as of 1991  were the Public Participation
8.  Bicnen  and van  de Walle.  1990, show the generality of the pattern where people who remain in office longer gain in
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Fund, the Mass Housing Fund, the Support Price Stabilization  Fund, and the Defense
Industries Support Fund.  Smaller funds included  the Justice Administration  Improvement
Fund, Mosque Construction  Assistance  Fund, Cement Fund, Fund for Measurement  and
Tuning Services, Universities Re-earch Development  Fund, and Tobacco Fund (Treasury
1992:  53).  They were initially  created as agencies to fund priority economic  activities, in
spite of the temporary borrowing constraints on the central government,  and as a way to
make imports of consumer  goods, like cigarettes and alcoholic beverages, socially  and
politically acceptable, because taxes on these imports went for popular purposes.  In 1984,
the new government announced  that a surcharge was to be levied on "luxury" goods, with
the revenues earmarked for the Mass Housing  and Public Participation  Fund aimed at
providing low-income  housing, particularly ir. the urban areas.
The funds were assigned to different ministri'.  s, usually according to their area of
concern.  Soon each ministry wanted to have one or more funds, for they were convenient
ways to avoid the scrutiny of the budget process.  A parliamentary law was necessary to set
up a fund and to define the goods on which it could set levies, but after that the amount of
the levy and the expenditure  of the fund could be set by decree.  The variable levies are set
by the appropriate Deputy Undersecretary  for Treasury and Foreign Trade, in consultation
with the relevant fund.  The check on the creation of new funds usually comes on the
revenue side; interest groups and legislators  will resist additional taxation, but this has not
been able to stop their proliferation, especially  where their trade taxes have protectionist
effects (Oyan, Aydin and Konukman, 1991). The revenue of the funds grew from 1.3
percent of GNP in 1981 to over 11 percent in 1990 -- over half of all public sector revenue
(Oyan and Aydin, 1991: 121, 125).
The levies create economic  distortions in several dimensions. The levies distort both
production and consumption  decisions,  except in the now small minority  of cases when they
are imposed on goods with a negative externalities  in consumption,  like cigarettes.  Mostly
they are like tariffs on narrowly defined categories of goods.  From a macroeconomic
perspective, the funds change aggregate spending  and taxation with usually no reference to
what the overall stance of fiscal policy should be.  The funds occasionally  make transfers to
the general budget, as in 1987. When a fund runs a deficit, however, it borrows as
necessary.  Although the loans to the funds carry a govemment  guarantee, they are not
coordinated  in the govemment's debt management  strategy.  Borrowing covered an average
of 25 percent of total expenses for funds in 1988-91  (UTFT, 1992:  57).  In 1989-91,
borrowing by the funds shifted strongly to foreign sources.
The funds have created distortions  in political dimensions  as well.  First, by removing
a substantial  part of the economic  decisions making from the normal bureaucratic routines
and from the possibility  of democratic  oversight, the Turkish political system has avoided
developing the consensus-building  procedures that are crucial for viable democracy. Second,
the expenditures  of the funds were often used to reward municipalities  that voted for ANAP.
The  import levies were also an important means to offer selective  protection against import
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transparency  of the import protection regime.  The actual level of protection for any branch
of industry was much more difficult to ascertain than from tariffs.  The locus of rent-seeking
also shifted to an administrative  arena, where specialized  knowledge  both of administrative
procedures and of the particular markets provided advantages.
The political  control over the funds has became  less centralized over time.  At first,
Ozal controlled the funds closely, as he did other aspects of economic  policy.  As the
number of funds grew, however, they proved to be too much for him to monitor, and no one
else had the authority to do so.  After Ozal ascended to the Presidency in 1989, control of
most activities  of the funds devolved to the separate ministries.  Until the end of the ANAP
period, the only remaining coherence derived from the fact that all the ministers  were from
the same party.  In 1992, the new government  moved to centralize control of the funds under
Treasury.
International economic community
International  organizations  -- the OECD, the European Community,  the World Bank
and the IMF -- played a big role in Turkey's adjustment  program, but were not able to
dictate most of its content.  Turkey has been a member  of the OECD since the beginning,
because of its participation  in the predecessor  organizations  created by the Marshall Plan.  In
the late 1970s, when Turkey's commercial  debt crisis became acute, the OECD organized a
consortium  to orchestrate the rescheduling  of Turkey's commercial  and bilateral debt.  The
fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion  of Afghanistan  increased  Turkey's strategic
importance  for NATO, motivating  OECD governments  to provide financing  directly and
through international  institutions. The OECD reports and other work provided background
material for the consortium meetings, which in turn put the muscle of some money  behind
the recommendations  of the OECD.
The European Community functioned  more as a source of role models and offered the
possibility of membership as an aspiration, for which Turkey knew it would have to improve
its policies in many dimensions.
The IMF and the World Bank influenced  both the long-term evolution of economic
philosophy  in Turkey and the short-term determination  of policies.  The influence  on
economic philosophy  was, if anything, the more direct.  Ozal worked at the Bank in the
1970s, where he was impressed with the arguments in favor of more open trade regimes. 9
Saracoglu worked at the IMF prior to coming to the central bank, and this presumably
influenced  his ideas on the proper conduct of macroecenomic  policy and the role of the
central bank.  The staff of the Bank and Fund developed  close working relationships  with
many staff in the central bank, the state planning  organization, and treasury, which led to
agreement on the diagnosis and prescriptions for Turkey's economic problems.
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The Bank and Fund were of course key players the development  of policy packages in
the early 1980s. There was a big need for balance  of payments support, and there was a
contest of economic  philosophies  within the Turkish government, and the backing of external
official financing  and technical advice was crucial in tipping the balance within the Demirel
government  and under the military. For the government,  it was important to be seen
publicly in Turkey as acting on their own initiative, rather than at the behest of the
international  institutions. For this reason, for instance, the January 1980 measures  were
launched in advance of formal agreements. The first SAL was not signed until April and the
new Fund Stand-by  not until June.  There were informal talks, however, as a routine Fund
mission  came to Ankara in December 1979, and then Ozal went to Washington  (Okyar
1983).  "...the World Bank was in a far better position to operate in secret than the Fund.
As an instrument, the SALs, and particularly the specific  conditions attached to them, were
virtually unknown to the public, and this enabled the Turkish government gradually to
present the measures  agreed with the Bank as,  its own policy. With hindsight, now that it has
actually materialized  as a medium-term  strategy, the adjustment program also appears more
consistent than could have been foreseen in early 1980, when the aim, as in previous years,
was to resolve the acute crisis and the debate centered on the Fund's restrictive conditions."
(Wolff, 1987, p.  117) Both the Bank and the Fund continued  active policy dialogue
throughout the 1980s. Turkey had five SALs in 1980-84,  and then four Sector Adjustment
Loans approved in 1984-88, making it by far the largest recipient  of balance of payments
support in that period.  Turkey had Stand-by  Arrangements  with the IMF in 1980, 1983, and
1984.  The influence  of both institutions  declined in the late 1980s, especially since the
Turkish economy  ran BOP surpluses in 1988-89  and restored its access to international
capital markets.
C.  POLICY  OUTCOMES
The picture of the political  economy of structural adjustment emerges more clearly as
we examine how the institutions  described above actually handled the key policy issues from
1980 to 1991. Turkey's trade and exchange rate reform succeeded  in bringing about a large
and beneficial structural change in the economy, despite some politically motivated  slippage
at the margins.  On the other hand, politically  motivated  slippage in macro policy left Turkey
with severe macro imbalances, despite occasional  and temporary  success in slowing inflation,
reducing the budget deficit, or stabilizing  the exchange rate.
Trade policy reform can be divided into three inter-related, yet distinct components:
real devaluation  and commitment  to a more flexible  exchange rate policy; export promotion
measures; and the liberalization  of imports.  The mix between these instruments  changed
during the three main period of the 1980s.
Fiscal deficits and inflation were two of the largest problems with Turkey's
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political pressures and let macro policy slip.'"  The main exceptions were when the urgency
of the situation made stabilization  the top priority.  On the other hand, the structural
adjustment succeeded  in shifting the whole context for macroeconomic  policy, by creating a
more open financial  and trade regime.  By the end of the 1980s, market forces had be
developed to act as constraints on the public sector -- the state had to pay a real interest rate
and to endure the inflation that were the consequences  of its macroeconomic  shortcomings.
By 1990, the state enterprises operated with more competition from the domestic and foreign
private sector.
First reform  wave -- 1980 - 1982
The first wave of reforms started with the January 24 measures in 1980  and continued
until Ozal's ouster in summer 1982.  From then until the end of the military government in
November 1983 there were some minor reversals of reform, although most of the reforms
were sustained  and provided a foundation from which further reforms could proceed.
Trade issues
In the first phase of trade reform, initiated  with the January 24th Measures, the
exchange rate and export subsidies were the most critical policy initiatives; the government's
objective was to increase the profitability  of the tradable goods sector quickly, relying on
existing capacity.  Some import liberalization  also occurred, but as Celasun and Rodrik
conclude, the adjustments in trade policy prior to 1984 were modest and "it is perhaps more
appropriate to regard the improvement  in the macroeconomic  context as the enabling cause of
trade liberalization, as opposcd to the other way around."  (Celasun  and Rodrik 1989, p.
720).
The first phase of trade reform emphasized  export promotion and other measures  to
eliminate  the foreign-exchange  constraints that had crippled the Turkish economy by winter
1979-80. Turkish growth since 1960 had been based on inward-oriented  expansion.  Exports
were under 5 percent of GDP.  With little foreign exchange coming in, the government
controlled its allocation closely and imposed  harsh penalties on those caught holding it
without authorization. Extensive regulations  for licensing  trade and allocating foreign
exchange fostered the expansion  of rent-seeking  activities, as described by Krueger in her
empirical as well as theoretical  work (1974a, 1974b, 1992).
In response to the oil shocks  of the early 1970s, Turkey had borrowed heavily from
abroad, running its external debt up to almost four times exports, although only about 20
percent of GDP.  When the 1979  oil shock hit, credit lines were already dried up, and the
government  did not have the foreign exchange to meet its debt payments.  Import restraints
tightened  further.  The experience of a winter in Ankara without heat or coffee made and
10. As the prcceding  sections  show, thc govcrnment  broadly conceived  was not a unitary entity, but thc term government
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with the spread of political violence made Turks willing to take the economic  and political
risk of measures  to open the economy.
Trade policy and exchange  rate reforms were central to the stabilization  and
adjustment program introduced on January 24, 1980, shortly after a new government  under
Demirel took office.  The most important reform was the 33 percent devaluation  of the
Turkish lira and elimination of almost all multiple exchange  rate practices.  Over the course
of the year, a number of small devaluations  followed until May 1981, when adjustment  began
on a daily basis.  While exchange rate adjustments  seem unremarkable  today, one must recall
that the Turkish public opinion prior to 1980 viewed devaluation  as a national disgrace and
as a severe political mistake for a government  (Saracoglu 1987). The reforms also
liberalized  access to foreign exchange, particularly for exporters and banks involved  in the
export business.  These included all the groups or conglomerates,  which dominate  Turkish
manufacturing,  trade, and banking.  For them, the remaining constraints on holding foreign
exchange were not binding, since their import-export  businesses  and foreign offices gave
ample opportunities  for legally holding marks and dollars.
The devaluations  had more than a passing effect in clearing the foreign exchange
market, because other measures contributed to bringing down inflation below the rate of
depreciation, thus effecting a real devaluation. The two main policies were reduction of the
fiscal deficit, discussed in a later section, and reduction of real wages.  Real wages declined
sharply with the rapid inflation in early 1980, and labor policy under the military kept them
from recovering. Table 1 shows the pattem of real wages and the real exchange rate,
calculated in terms of WPI purchasing power.  Labor groups were politically  active in 1980,
up until the time of the coup, but did not focus on or succeed in getting wage increases to
match inflation. The military government promptly  disbanded  all unions and forbade strikes.
Any wage disputes were settled by binding  arbitration.  Wages were typically set with two-
year contracts. The first year increase usually  provided only a partial catch up and the
second year increase was predetermined  and based on a forecast of inflation that was usually
lower than what actually occurred (Vieira da Cunha, Webb and Isaac, 1990). As a result,
real wages declined.  To make this harsh wage regime politically  sustainable, even in the
short term, it was combined with an agreement by all major private and public sector
employers not to lay off workers.  Thus unemployment  was disguised, and the cost of it
spread over most of the work force.  As the economy recovered the underemployment
declined, as well as the unemployment.
The policies of suppressing  both real wages and lay-offs carried Turkey through the
early 80s.  They could not be sustained, of course, in an economy experiencing  major
structural change and real growth, and in a society where democracy was the norm and
military rule was not considered legitimate  except in unusual  and temporary circumstances.
Unwinding  the policies became a problem mainly at the end of the decade, as described later.
Export promotion measures  inzluded a variety of incentives, several of which
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table 3.  They ran as high as 40 percent for industrial exports.  Tax rebates were initially
designed to compensate  exporters for indirect taxes and as a substitute  for a VAT rebate,
which is allowed under the GAIT.  The term rebate is really a misnomer, however. First, the
subsidy  rate was not related to the total amount of taxes paid by the exporter, and could
exceed it.  Second, the rebate scheme was introduced  prior to the introduction  of the VAT,
and when the actual VAT rebate was added, the prior rebate scheme remained as a pure
subsidy.  Over the long term, these subsidies  are correctly viewed as undesirable  distortions.
In the short-run, however, they may have had some rationale  as a way to foster infant
industries and, perhaps more important, to speed up the expansion  of trading and
manufacturing  firms in the export sector.  These firms had a vested interest in supporting  the
internationalist  stance of the Ozal government.
Table 3.  Export Incentives
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Total  22%  21%  22%  24%  14%  19%  25%  23%  15%  8%
Export Tax Rate  1  4  10  12  11  7  6  5  4  2
Duty Free Imports  6  5  4  6  3  10  14  12  4  -
Pref.  Export Credits
or  FX Allocation  16  13  7  7  *-  - - - - -
Cash Grants and
Corp.  Tax Rebates  - - - - 3  6  7  6  6
Source:  Bateinan  and  Arslan, 1989.
The export subsidy rates for the manufacturing  sector from 1980 through 1983
averaged 22 percent.  (See table 3 and Milanovic 1986.) In the first two years of the
program, this subsidy was largely in the form of export credits.  The subsidy  varied widely -
- some sectors, such as metal products, received subsidies  over 100 percent.  Milanovic's
calculation show that the higher subsidy rates appeared to go to those sectors in which
import-substitution  had been of long-standing,  including  ferrous and non-ferrous metals,
electrical and non-electrical  machinery  and transport equipment. These were mostly sectors
where public-sector  enterprises were predominant, but the private firms tended to be more
involved  in the export-oriented  subsectors, because they could produce the higher quality
products demanded  in the export markets.
Not all exports were effectively  subsidized. Agriculture, traditionally  a stronghold  for
the Justice Party, lost subsidies. The January 1980 measures  established  a Price Support and
Stability Fund at the Central Bank.  The Fund, one of the first new extra-budgetary  funds,
was financed by a levy equal to the difference  between export receipts and domestic support
prices for agricultural products.  In effect, a tax on agricultural exports would be used to
subsidize  basic agricultural inputs purchased  by farmers, but also to finance export-oriented
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There was some liberalization  of imports in the early 1980s. Since 1958, when
Turkey initiated its annual import programs, all imports were divided between a liberalized
and quota list. The liberalized lists contained  goods considered  essential for objectives  of the
economic  plans; the quota list contained  less essential goods and competing imports. In 1980,
the quota list was reduced only slightly, but in 1981 it was eliminated.  Most of the items
from the quota list moved to the liberalized list of goods, and the government retained a
positive list system of prohibited  goods and a licensing system. Advance deposit requirements
were also lowered, though a distinction  was still drawn between "importers"  and
"industrialists," with the former required to pay more substantial  deposits. (See appendix
table 2.)  Perhaps the most dramatic liberalization  pertained to exporters. Import taxes on
raw materials  and intermediary  goods imported for incorporation  in Turkish exports were
reduced to zero, providing the exporter had the foreign exchange to finance the transaction.
Macroeconomic  issues
The January 24, 1980 measures  contained  only a few measures  that directly addressed
the deficit and inflation problems, because the shortage of foreign exchange was the more
immediate  problem, and it was not yet realized how comprehensive  a solution would be
necessary.  Some key measures  had the immediate  effect of increasing inflation -- devaluing
currency, abolishing the Price Control Committee, and requiring SEEs to balance their
budgets and allowing them to do so by raising prices.  As devaluation  and elimination of
price controls reduced production bottlenecks  in the medium-term, supply and output
expanded, reducing inflation  pressures.  The price increases to balance the SEE budgets were
necessary for reducing unsustainable  deficits and long-term inflation. The increases were
equivalent  to excise taxes and were indispensable  to the stabilization  effort.  In order to
assure that the SEE price increases, as well as the devaluation,  were not totally passed along
into inflation, money  and credit expansion  had to be slowed.  Monetary policy tightened
under the guidance of the newly created Money and Credit Committee, but not enough to
prevent an increase of average prices that was unprecedented  for Turkey.  Interest rates were
liberalized  in July 1980, so that the effects of tight money  would pass through to the rest of
the economy, although  collusion among banks delayed this effect until the following  winter
(Saracoglu 1987).
Even though any economist would  agree that the January measures improved the
trajectory of the Turkish economy, compared to an attempt to persist with the status quo,
average prices increased more in the subsequent  year than in the year preceding.  Real wages
and real prices for many goods and services in the non-traded sector did not keep up with
overall inflation.  Although many of the resulting  changes in relative prices were necessary,
they caused intense frustration among some groups, which contributed to the continuation  of
political violence.
With the military takeover, Ozal received a mandate to proceed directly with
whatever fiscal adjustment he thought necessary.  He boasted in the press that he was acting
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see Ulagay 1987).  In light of Ozal's subsequent  display of political skills, one should not
take such statements too literally, but they do suggest that the military government freed him
from the short-run political considerations  that were later to play such havoc with fiscal
policy.
Monthly price increases remained  high through 1980, roughly doubling over the year,
but then the rate of increase dropped quickly in 1981 to around 35 percent per year, where it
remained through 1983.  (See figure 1.)
An economist  careful with words would describe most of the increase in the average
price level in 1980 as a one-time  adjustment to recognize previously suppressed inflation, and
not true inflation. The distinction  was not clear or important to most Turks, especially those
who had been getting rents in the form of excess real wages and privileged  access to scarce
foreign exchange.  Some of these groups were active in the protests of summer 1980.
Why did inflation persist at over 30 percent annually after mid 1981 when the
government  still had substantial  instruments  of persuasion at its disposal? With two-year,
overlapping  wage contracts, the goal of lower inflation  not only conflicted with the goal of
further real devaluation,  but a key element in achieving  the real devaluation  was the
persistence of inflation in the face of nominal  wage increases in the second contract year that
were based on lower inflation projections (Vieira da Cunha, Webb, and Isaac 1991). Also,
the military government did not want to press fiscal austerity and tight money to the point
were some of their supporters would suffer.  This comes out most clearly in the Bankers'
crisis in summer 1982, when the military insisted on relaxing the stabilization  measures to
prevent politically  damaging bankruptcies. This serves as a reminder that military,
authoritarian  governments  are not immune to interest group pressures.
The military expected to stay in control longer than three years, either directly or
through a hand-picked  successor, and therefore thought that the gradual disinflation policy
they had been following  would have time to complete  its course.  Leading up to the election
in 1983, they did not realize how important the issue remained for people, and the ANAP
party campaigned  with a platform of making inflation the principal target for policy reform.
Politics
Ideas for the reform package developed  in several places.  Some economists  in the
bureaucracy and academia were already advocating devaluation  and trade liberalization  in late
1970s. The industrial groups in TUSIAD formed the core of interests that would ultimately
benefit from open-economy  policies, and in 1978 they published  an article by Turgut Ozal
that argued for most of the policies ultimately  included in the package.  Krueger and Turan
(1991) are wise in advising caution about attributing the adoption of the program to pressure
from TUSIAD, however.  The article by Ozal in 1977 is well within the tradition that the
president of TUSIAD, then Feyyaz Berker of the Tekfen Group, would sponsor a position
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government. The World Bank, the IFC, and the IMF were also advocating such policies,
both on the basis of analysis by their own economists  and as conduit for Turkish business
opinion (G. Ercel interview).  Ozal worked at the WVorld  Bank in the early 1970s, and the
experience strongly influenced  his views on economic  policy (speech, Nov. 1991). It seems
entirely plausible that Ozal himself was the only node at which all these influences
converged. Although the program was consonant  with many of the ideas current in the
business community,  there was not an open consultation  process between policy makers and
the economic interests within Turkey that were effected.
Demirel and Ozal briefed the top military leaders, and presumably  the Bank and Fund
officials, to assure their support, but did not tell all of the ministers of the government  what
would be in the pacLage. Even the Minister of Finance was not informed, although many of
his staff had worked on bits and pieces of the program, without being shown the whole
picture.  The top technocrats often took pride in the extent to which they had pulled off a
surprise move, and for measures like the exchange  rate devaluation  such secrecy was crucial
(Krueger and Turan 1991; interviews with Canevi and G. Ercel).
In this first phase, the reform package benefitted  many different groups, compared to
their suffering from the inflation and foreign exchange shortage, so that many of the usual
dispute over distribution were put aside, making the political choices easier.  Export
promotion, through exchange rate undervaluation  as well as direct subsidy, very quickly
increased the aggregate supply of foreign exchange, allowing  most parts of the economy to
have greater access to foreign exchange. The increase took place directly through higher
export earnings and also through greater availability  of external finance, in response to the
evidence of export growth."  Since imports were vital inputs to virtually all sectors --
import competing  and non-traded, as well as export -- virtually everyone in Turkey benefitted
from the relaxation of the severe import constraints that arose in the crisis of the late 1970s.
The international  community  of Turkey's financiers was also pleased. The emphasis on
export promotion and restoring financing  flows in the first phase stimulated  some recovery of
employment. That environment made it easier, although  perhaps not sufficiently  so, to
complete the removal of distortions with measures  that might require substantial  exit from
subsidized  sectors.  Given the continuing  weight of import-substituting  industries  in the
economy, and presumably their political clout as well, no effort was made to confront these
producers directly through extensive liberalization,  despite the additional protection they
received from the devaluation  itself.  Firms with substantial  import-competing  lines, such as
Koc, whose products include cars and home appliances, still lobbied for protection in those
particular sectors, but they also favored the framework  of a more open economy  with a
competitive  real exchange rate.  The main interests that lost were agricultural and labor.12
11. Diwan 1990 explains how export promotion  measures, which  would create distortions  and inefficiencies  in other
contexts,  can increase  welfare when they are integral  to a strategy  for debt rescheduling.
12. Ozmucur 1991,  Boratav 1990.  Many small businesses  lost from the stabilization  package, because  of the high interest
costs, but small-business  activities  were so varied that a comprehensive  assessment  is not possible.  Many small  firms
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How important were political events for trade and exchange rate policy? Obviously,
the change of government  from Ecevit to Demirel in November 1979 was crucial.  Ecevit in
that period would never have brought a market-oriented,  TUSIAD-supported  technocrat like
Ozal to head up the economic  team.  The biggest question concerns the relation of policy
reform to the military coup.  The behind-the-scenes  pressure of the military in January 1980
for the government  to do something about the political and social disorder was also a factor,
although it was the civilians who had to sell the military on the need for radical adjustment
measures. The political turmoil did not prevent the initiation of adjustment, but it probably
would have derailed the program if the military had not intervened. The military did not
takeover  in order to promote (oi to prevent) the economic  policies of the Demirel-Ozal
government,  but rather to quell political unrest that most of the population  agreed had
become  intolerable.  The political violence predated the January 1980 adjustment  measures,
and its continuation  was only partially in reaction to them.
The January 1980 measures  angered the unions, because of their economic  effects,
like reduced real wages, and because of the exclusion  of unions from the process of
designing the measures.  Strikes and other forms of labor unrest, often violent, became
increasingly  common during summer 1980. While some of this would have occurred in any
case, as a symptom  of long-term political factors, the short-run impact of the January
measures  contributed to making the disruptions  severe enough to motivate  the military to
intervene. Turkey's experience with the initial phase of the adjustment program in 1980
certainly supports the hypothesis  that political management  of adjustment  becomes difficult if
not impossible when a strong labor movement  is not incorporated into the policy process.
During their tenure in power, the military supported adjustment  passively during the
years when Ozal remained in charge of economic policy, but not after the military put in
their own man.  By cracking down on unions and imposing  tighter social discipline
generally, the military helped create the political environment  where the stabilization  and
adjustment  began to take effect.  After Ozal's departure from the government in 1982, along
with the core of his economic  team, the military government  reversed the real depreciation
that had been launched with maxi-devaluation  in 1980; there was some real appreciation in
1982. The military did not push ahead with deficit reduction or trade liberalization, not to
mention privatization.  This verifies the impression from the events of 1980 -- the military did
not take over in order to impose a strict adjustment  program.
The centralized, top-down institutions  of policy making under Ozal and the military
were well suited to policy making in the first phase of adjustment. In the first phase of
adjustment, moving fast was important to resolve the crisis and to take advantage  of the fresh
memory of crisis to push through bold initiatives.
Sustaining  and extending reform with democratization:  The mid-1980s
A second phase of reform began after the election of November 1983, and most of
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emerge from Turkey's experience in the mid 1980s. Ozal's government  was committed to a
more market-oriented  approach, de-emphasizing  subsidies  and using active exchange-rate
management  and import liberalization, including  the removal of quantitative  restrictions  and a
reform of tariffs.  Some changes, such as the shift to a negative list system, were sudden, but
other reforms, including the lowering of tardffs,  were introduced gradually and selectively.
The scope of liberalization  was also partly offset by taxes and surcharges which, while
apparently  initiated for revenue reasons, had clear protective effects.  Nonetheless,  both the
level and dispersion  of nominal  and effective  rates of protection was reduced.
The military government had already restarted the devaluation  policy before the
election,  and Ozal continued it through the first half of 1984. During the second half of
1984 and the first half of 1985, the real exchange  rate was once again allowed to appreciate.
The reasons for this are unclear, but probably reflect some lag in the adjustment of the rate
to domestic inflation, which was higher than anticipated. In order to continue the export
drive, the government  resumed aggressive devaluation  in 1986.  See Table 1.
The continued moderation or suppression  of wage demands was a critical factor in
keeping domestic inflation below the rate of exchange  depreciation  in the mid-1980s. From
1982 to 1988, industrial wages rose less than domestic  inflation and exchange depreciation  in
every year but 1987, leading to declining  real wages.  See Table 1.  The policy and political
reasc-  . ". r this outcome are obvious.  Strikes remained  illegal in the private sector until
1987, and for the public sector unions they were still illegal in 1991. Wage labor was
definitely a minority of the economically  active population, however, and the ANAP had
some success in appealing even to labor on more diffuse economic  issues, such as general
prosperity (lower unemployment),  and on religious or nationalist grounds.
The system of import lists was revised in December 1983. Although many
restrictions remained, it was a substantial  liberalization. Under the old system, everything
not on the QR lists was prohibited; the new system had three lists and all other imports were
permitted without quantitative  limit.  Intermediate  inputs and investment  goods were easier to
import, although still with licenses.  Some consumer  goods were still prohibited, but many
were unlisted or readily importable with the payment of a special levy on luxuries.  SPO
handled the licensing but no longer used its discretion to reward or punish firms according
to whether they were meeting  plan targets (Baysan  and Blitzer 1991). After 1983, the
number of categories of goods requiring import licenses declined in every year except 1985,
declining from 821 in 1983 to 33 in 1889.
Tariff rates were adjusted in December 1983 and again in January 1984. Some rates
went down and others went up, but the overall effect was strongly liberalizing, especially  in
January.  Explicitly to cushion the impact of liberalizing the licensing system, tariff
protection was reduced less in sectors that lost the most licensing protection.  Most consumer
imports were completely liberalized from QRs, but their tariffs were increased, particularly
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capital goods, but most of them remained on one list or another, usually the second.  For
intermediate  goods, there was reduced protection from both licensing and tariffs.
The institutions  for distributing  incentive  certificates consciously  emulated the
Japanese and Korean models  of creating general trading companies. Trading companies  with
exports in 1983 of $30 million, of which at least 75 percent had to consist of industrial and
mining products, were given certificates  automatically. The annual export requirement was
to be raised each year by 10 percent.  The policy contributed further to the concentration  of
Turkish business and also to creation of a self-conscious  interest group favoring open trade,
but not necessarily  supporting  free trade (Onis, 1992).
Foreign exchange regulations  were also liberalized in December 1983 and January
1984. Banks were allowed to deal freely in foreign exchange at a market rate, as long as it
was within 6 percent of the (frequently  adjusted)  official rate.  Turkish citizens were allowed
to hold foreign exchange and to open domestic  bank accounts  denominated  in foreign
exchange; they could not yet freely convert lira to foreign exchange. Except for the allowing
of foreign exchange deposits, these regulatory  changes only made official and more
irrevocable the situation that had been de facto in force since 1980.  Nevertheless,  the
changes were important  because before 1980 the power of the government  -- specifically  the
Finance Ministry -- to allocate scarce foreign exchange had been one of the important
channels for rent seeking and for enforcement  of the central-planning  targets.  Thus, official
liberalization  of the foreign exchange regime was an important  complement to the relaxation
of the licensing system in demonstrating  the government's commitment  to continue moving
toward a more market-directed  economy.
Ozal had promised in the 1983 campaign  to bring inflation under 10 percent within a
year, but his government never achieved this objective.  In 1984, the new government
concentrated  on its other electoral pledge, to end the economic hardships  associated  with
stabilization. Ozal decided to try supply-side  tax cuts, combined with expanded public
investment, export subsidies, and accelerated  depreciation  of the lira, in order to stimulate
economic  growth.  The policies did not have the hoped-for effect of stimulating  private
investment, which remained  well below the levels of the 1970s, but the package did stimulate
aggregate demand and thus output growth.  Because the expansion  resulted from a shift of
the demand curve more than a shift of the supply curve, inflation increased again, from 31
percent in 1982-83  to 48 percent in  1984. Stimulating  a boom immediately  after an election
runs counter to the logic of the electoral business cycle.  The government did not need to
heat up the economy to look good for an election." 3 They seem to have been genuinely
surprised at the infiation in 1984.
The rising inflation alarmed Ozal, and the OECD, IMF and the World Bank as well.
These supporting external agencies worked closely with Treasury, the Central Bank, and
SPO to develop a stabilization  program.  Again, the ability of the upper bureaucracy  to act
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decisively  when it had Ozal's support was crucial.  Reducing  export subsidies and
introducing  a value-added  tax also contributed to the stabilization,  as well as to the
fundamentals  of Turkey's structural adjustment.
For political and institutional  reasons, these measures  did not realize their full fiscal
potential.  When export growth flagged, the government  raised the export subsidies  again in
1985-86. To enforce collection of the VAT, the government  setup an elaborate rebate
scheme. Besides  drastically reducing the effective  rate of the VAT, the scheme became a
large entitlement  program whose removal or serious reduction would arouse political protest.
Also, the government did not follow through on complementary  fiscal measures, such as
permanently  reducing subsidies  to state enterprises and raising corporate income taxes.
Unlike the typical case of persistent moderate  inflation, monetary financing  of
government  deficits played an important  role in Turkey up through 1988 (Anand, Rocha and
Van Wijnbergen 1988; cf. Dornbusch and Fischer 1991). Expansion of central bank credit
to the private sector was not a serious contributor  to inflation.
The policy reforms of 1983-84  had been planned in advance  of the election by Ozal
and his top advisors, and, at least in broad outline, trade liberalization  had been part of
ANAP's electoral platform (Keesings  30: 32926).  The ability of the government to modify
quickly the trade incentive in January was an important result of the bureaucratic reforms in
December, namely creating the UTFT.  Several studies by the World Bank in the mid 1980s
helped  prepare the trade measures, but this was not a case of imposing  reforms through
conditionality,  but more of technical assistance in an endeavor fully supported by the
government.
To win political support for his program, Ozal exploited  the theme of the absence of
an alternative economic  program.  He pointed to the improved  performance of the economy
and to Turkey's renewed ability to attract external resources on a large scale, which
contributed to the rapid recovery of the economy in the early 1980s (Celasun and Rodrik
1987; Celasun 1990). ANAP's popularity in the mid-1980s,  also derived from measures
which may be termed popular capitalism. Financial  liberalization, for example the transition
of positive real rates of interest on bank deposits, was instrumental  in generating  a new
group of middle-income  rentiers who directly benefitted  from the program and added to
ANAP's base of support.  Similarly, the early features of the privatization  program
contributed  to ANAP's success in the mid-1980s. The sale of revenue-share  certificates was
popular as a mechanism  for extending  property ownership to middle-  and lower-income
groups.  The extensive housing program and the development  of infrastructure extended  basic
amenities to many parts of the country.
Although  trade reform was surely a less important  factor in appealing to the voters in
1983 than the memory of the successful  reforms in 1980 and the position of ANAP as the
sole alternative  to the military-sponsored  parties, there was no sense that trade liberalization
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import-competing  manufacturing  was done by the large conglomerates. They accepted the
measures  because what they lost from the import liberalization  was more than made up for
with the improved  business opportunities  in the financial  and export sectors.
Turkey's top-down institutions  of decision-making  continued to work well in the trade
policy area during the second reform phase, because it was important to move quickly in
order to take advantage  of the honeymoon  after the start of restoring democracy.  An
opportunity  was lost, however, to bring a broad spectrum of industrialists  and other exporters
into the decision process.  Individual  businessmen  continued  to petition for specific favors,
but there were only ad hoc consultations  on the major changes, and not with organized
interest groups.  14
Policy oscillations since 1987
While the elections of 1987 largely completed the process of reestablishing  electoral
democracy  in Turkey, major aspects of economic  reform remained to be completed,
especially  liberalizing imports and reducing fiscal deficits and inflation. Some of this agenda
was completed  by 1991, but much was not, and there were many policy reversals.  Often the
difficulties  in sustaining  reform derived from characteristics  of the democratic system in
Turkey.
Trade  policy
Although  there were no clear breaks in trade policy in the late 1980s, there was a
notable increase in the pattern of "two steps forward, one step backward."" 5 In 1986-88
liberalizing trends coexisted with the growth of backdoor  barriers in the form of surcharges
and taxes, but then in 1989-90 there was a movement  toward freer trade.  That movement
was not complete  or uniform, however, for two reasons.  First, there was some fragmenting
in the responsibility  for trade policy and erosion of the centralized  bureaucratic process that
characterized the decisions of the mid 1980s. Also, a wider range of firms was brought into
discussion of the measures  beforehand (interview,  Nishimizu). By the end of the decade,
despite tremendous  export performance  and an improvement  over the system of the 1970s,
Turkey retained many features of an import-substituting  system, with nominal  protection in
some sectors offset by subsidies  to exporters.
The high volume of trade by the late 1980s suggests  that distortions had decreased
markedly; also, the actual pattern of trade corresponds  in rough outline with what one would
surmise is Turkey's comparative  advantage. Thus there was probably not a high static
14. Interview  with Canevi.
15. This expression  in Turkish alludes to a famous  and generally  successful  battle tactic  of the Ottoman  army.  To achieve
victory against the opponents  of reform, as against  the enemies  of the olden empire, the tactic requires discipline  to assure
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welfare loss from the trade regime by' the late 1980s. The majority of the welfare loss was
probably a dynamic one, arising because uncertainty  discouraged  investment and therefore
reduced productivity  growth.  There remains considerable  variation in protection because of
EBF levies, although their absolute level is not high, often varying down to zero.  This
variation seems to have become more discretionary  and created many opportunities  for rent-
seeking.  The multiplicity  of tariffs, levies, QRs and incentives make it hard to tell at any
point in time how the relative prices of inputs and outputs for a sector compare to those in
the world market.  Quantitative  studies of effective  protection, such as Olgun and Togan
(1989, cited in OECD 1990/91, pp. 86-89) are based on legal tariff rates, and they do not
systematically  take account of the effects of QRs and export incentives. The lack of
transparency  and frequent changes were confusing not only to bureaucrats and academics,  but
also to firms.  They were not sure how the trade regulations  affected the relative profitability
of two activities, but were relatively sure that those regulations  would change in a year or
two.
The geometry of Turkey's trade reforms, shown in figure 2, sheds light on the
political  economy.  The trade liberalization  of the early 1980s had two politically  favorable
features.  First, the degree of distortion was very large initially, so the triangles of efficiency
gain were large relative to the rectangles of transfers.  As Rodrik shows elegantly, this
increases the likelihood  of reform.  Also, Turkey was a classic case of the trade reform
being packaged with a stabilization  and external financing  package that provided large and
quick gains, overshadowing  the distributional  issues in the early 1980s (Rodrik 1992).  In the
mid 1980s, the triangles of efficiency gains were smaller and the policy makers had to rely
more on rising income through steady growth to distract people from the distributional
issues.  By the late 1980s, the tremendous  expansion  of trade made the rectangles of
redistribution  very long and thus large even for small changes of the tariff rate.  Large
reductions in tariffs were no longer possible and large increases were out of the question, but
even small changes became big favors because of the high volume.  Protection  became
politicized  again, in the context of a basically open trade regime.
In 1986-88,  import policy vacillated. The number of items subject to restrictive
licensing was reduced in May 1986, but in July the advance  deposits for imports were
increased, although they had been virtually eliminated  in 1884-85. The import surcharge
earmarked for the Price Stability and Support Fund was increased in December 1986 and
then again in October 1987. In January 1988 the number of items requiring import licenses,
which had slipped back up to 111, was reduced to 33, and customs tariffs were lowered for
234 items, including basic industrial inputs.  This brought all tariffs rates under 50 percent,
although this was partially off-set by applying surcharges  to more goods and raising the
stamp duty on imports. In 1988 total import taxes were 13 percent of the total value of
imports, and 37 percent of the value of dutiable imports.  Customs  duties per se were less
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Table 4.  Average Tariff Rates (all averages unweighted)
1987  1988  November  1989
All Categories  30  24  11
Agriculture  22  18  11
Mining (& petroleum)  17  18  6
Manufacoiring  31  25  11
Consumer  goods  45  35  17
Intermed. goods  21  17  6
Capital goods  32  30  10
Source:  Bateman and Arslan,  1989, tables 2, 4.
In 1989 and  1990 the direction of change became clearer,  with major liberalization of
import licensing and tariffs -- the main instruments of protectionism  in the past.  In August
and September  1989, tariffs (and surcharges) were lowered on over 300 items,  mostly
consumer goods.  (During  1989 the import regime was modified at least seven times.)  In
January  1990 the list of items subject to import licensing was abolished,  all import deposit
guarantees were eliminated,  custom duties were reduced for 7,545 items and eliminated for
333 items, and  surcharges were reduced  for 1,255 items and eliminated for 2,357 items.
Some barriers and  distortions remained,  as discussed below,  but the main instruments of
protection had been eliminated or reduced to such a level that it would involve a major
policy decision to restore widespread import protection.
The vacillation of trade policy in  1986-88 is consistent with a story of the government
having a general objective of trade liberalization,  but frequently compromising  in order  to
limit trade deficits and to reward politically favored groups.  Major  steps were taken in the
direction of trade liberalization and establishing full currency convertability in August 1989.
What explains the more consistent liberalizing trend after mid  1989?  The government had
planned after the election in fall 1987 to liberalize imports further.  Liberalization  had to
come sometime in the next few years anyway, in order to meet Turkey's  obligations to
GATT and to get back on track with a process of unifying tariffs with the European
Community,  a process  that the Turks had halted during their  troubles of the late  1970s.
(Bateman and Arslan  1989, p.  5; M. Nishimizu, interview,  May  1991).  From  the view
point of a traditional  electoral cycle viewpoint, early  1988 would have been a good time, in
order  to get short-run costs out of the way and to have time to realize the efficiency gains
from liberalization.  In early  1988, however,  the government  faced a recession resulting from
its anti-inflation stabilization efforts and therefore  decided to defer the import liberalization.
Also, there were still immediate concerns about external credit and  foreign exchange
constraints.  By late  1988 the situation had changed.  The economy was booming, led by
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1988 the Turks confirmed in a speech to the EC Ad-hoc Committee  that they would fulfill all
remaining obligations  to tariff reductions on an accelerated  schedule, by 1995 (Bateman  and
Arslan, 1989, p. 5).
Short-run political concerns also added to the pressure for liberalization: high inflation
had persisted for over a year, and polls conducted  just after the municipal elections in March
1989 singled  out inflation as the most important  cause for ANAP's unexpected  set back.  To
stem the ebb of his popularity, Ozal felt that he had to do more to combat inflation. He had
since the 1970s put forth the argument that liberalizing imports could combat inflationary
pressure from domestic monopolies  (D. Gokce, source).  It would lower the price of
imports, with a direct impact on price indices  and therefore on wage demands, and it would
reduce aggregate demand for domestic products, as purchases switched to import goods.' 6
There have been two wild cards in the array of protectionist  instruments  in Turkey --
levies by the EBFs and customs-duty  exemptions  for incentive programs.  The protective
effect of the import levies imposed by the EBB increase in the late 1980s. In 1987, the
levies contributed approximately  6.1 percentage points to an overall rate of nominal
protection of 25.5 percent.  More interesting  from a political economy perspective,  however,
is the sectoral incidence of the levies and the way in which they contribute to a highly
uneven tariff structure.  In general, consumer goods and agricultural products have managed
to secure the highest level of protection from the levies, with relative less for capital goods
producers and virtually none for intermediate  goods. Some traditional  consumer goods
industries, including  beverages and cigarettes, and the transport sector, have been able to
secure very high levels of protection, for instance 83 percent on autos. (Bateman  and Arslan,
1989).
Exemptions  to import duties were widely  granted in the 1980s  as a way to encourage
certain economic activities, particularly investment  and export production, (Bateman  and
Arslan, 1989). In 1988 over two thirds of imports were exempt from all import taxes, not
only from customs duties.  Just over half of imports were duty free because they were for
investment  or export production (Bateman  and Arslan 1989, p. 1).  Exemptions  were
sometimes  granted as purely political favors.  In some notable cases, an importer had a large
shipment waiting in port, and then a short term exemption  would be granted for that
particular category.  Obviously the importer in question would gain a tremendous  advantage
over his competitors, at the expense of the public treasury and of the stability of incentives
for domestic producers.  Other widely-known  abuses, like export subsidies  granted for
fictitious exports by politically favored firms, became  an embarrassment  to the government
and contributed to ANAP's setbacks in the municipal  elections of March 1989.
16.  To some  extent. these  effects would be mitigated by the effect of import liberalization on the real exchange rate.
causing it to depreciate  by increasing  the demand  for foreign  exchange. Depreciation  would push import prices back up and
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Contemporaneous  with the growth of backdoor  import protection in the late 1980s
was a return to more aggressive  export support measures, such as duty-free imports, tax
rebates, and subsidized  credit.  Table 3 shows the changing structure of export incentives.
Macroeconomic slippage
The macroeconomic  situation  in Turkey in the late 1980s deteriorated seriously, and
two of the major causes were political -- electoral cycles and the increased union power of a
work force eager to restore real wages, especially in the public sector.  In the 1987 electoral
campaign, Ozal promised to reduce inflation, but did not state any specific target, as he had
in 1983. Those targets had been badly missed, so Ozal softened his promises and started to
talk of inflation as a price of high growth (Ulagay 1990).
Turkey's macroeconomic  problems and attempted solutions in the late 1980s  were
closely related to the several elections, but there was not a clear pattern that repeats itself.
This illustrates two important points:
The government  always wanted  lower inflation, but sometimes  it was willing
to tolerate higher inflation, especially  if it would not come until after an
election.
The macroeconomy  was not predictable  enough for the government to plan
inflation or deflation cycles, in a way to improve consistently  its electoral
performance.
Before the election, the government  increased deficits to finance more public-works
projects and subsidies  and to cover losses of the state-owned  enterprises whose prices were
being temporarily  repressed, to hold down measured  inflation. After the election, public
prices would have to be increased to cover costs, and this would give a big boost to the
inflation rate, especially since the public sector products were often inputs.  The general
election in 1987 exemplified  this most clearly (Kjellstrom 1990).  Central bank credit to the
government  grew 40 percent in 1986, 60 percent in 1987, and 40 percent in 1988 (Central
Bank and World Bank staff estimates).
In the aftermath of the March 1989 elections, the ANAP government made a
concerted effort to compete with DYP, in order to enlarge its rural electoral base.  A direct
manifestation  of these efforts involved  a striking increase in agricultural subsidies  via the
traditional  instrument -- the support pricing scheme -- which,  in turn,  contributed to the
growing fiscal instability in the late 1980s and the early 1990s.
Exchange rate policy became more complex  in the late 1980s. The government still
wanted the exchange rate to help stimulate  exports and to control inflation, although it could
not do both at once, but the government  relinquished  its direct control of the exchange rate,
leaving it more as a intervening market response to other policies, especially monetary and
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From 1986 to mid 1988, the government wanted strong exports to complete the
restoration of its external creditworthiness,  and hence resumed its aggressive devaluation
policy, linking the adjustment  to recent inflation. Money growth stayed high to sustain the
undervaluation  and to provide monetary financing  of deficits.  Both fiscal and real exchange
rate factors thus contributed to the problem of inflation (Vieira da Cunha, Webb, and Isaac
1990).  Saracoglu  and others at the Central Bank realized that reducing inflation would be
impossible with a devaluation  policy aimed at reducing the real exchange rate.  The well-
publicized lessons of the Southern Cone experience showed that it was risky and ultimately
ineffective  to try to use the nominal exchange rate as anti-inflationary instrument, especially
when the fiscal deficit was not yet under control.  A prerequisite  for an anti-inflation  policy
at the central bank, in the presence of high budget deficits, was letting the exchange rate
float.
By late 1988 Turkey was running a current account surplus, and in October 1988 the
government  decided to let the rate float.  When a run on the lira ensued, the central bank
responded  not by backtracking  on the floating  rate but rather by sharply tightening  credit in
the recently developed  interbank over-night money market. The central bank subsequently
loosened credit when the crisis passed, keeping the real exchange rate at about its pre-
October level."i In contrast to the bad impression  created by the failed stabilization  attempt
in early 1988, the central bank in fall 1988 seized the high ground, demonstrating  that tight
credit and high interest rates were effective  and sometimes  necessary means to fight
speculation  against the national currency and to prevent rapid depreciation  that could lead to
runaway inflation. The floating exchange rate was obviously managed, through the market,
to prevent short-term  gyrations, but henceforth  the central bank would be able to let
economic  fundamentals  take their course.
After 1988 the exchange rate policy was motivated mainly by macro considerations,
and the effects on trade were incidental  and largely undesired.  Although  the real exchange
rate continues to have important  effects on trade, the nominal  exchange rate policy was no
longer driven primarily by trade considerations. In 1989-91, the combination  of rising fiscal
deficits with tight monetary policy led to rising real interest rates, capital inflow and real
appreciation,  as the nominal depreciation  slowed relative to the inflation rate.  The fiscal
deficits rose for the usually  political reasons -- the government  thought it could win votes by
increased spending  and avoid losing votes by holding  down taxes.  It lacked the institutional
linkages that would let it appeal to many groups on any basis other than special favors of
spending  or tax breaks.  Tight monetary  policy was used to fight inflation, with the
realization that one channel for its short-run  anti-inflation  effects, especially  in 1990, was
through increased overvaluation  (Krueger and Turan 1992).
17. There was great concern about distress in the banking system  at this time, making  the central bank reluctant  to push up
real interest rates permanently. Also, continued  tight money would  cause the real exchange  rate to appreciate,  and the
central bank presumably  did not want the floating  rate regime  immediately  associated  with overvaluation. Stopping  inflation
almost  always leads to some overvaluation,  whether or not the exchange  rate is used as a control instrument  (Domnbusch
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The government's influence  over the real exchange rate also declined in the late 1980s
as the relaxation of legal constraint on the labor movement  led to increasing strike actvity
and more generous wage settlements. Nevertheless,  the share of labor costs in value added
was still low in 1990-91 relative to the rest of Southern Europe, and relative to the 1970s
(OECD 1990/91: 99; Ozmucur 1991). Wages had not yet had a major effect on the real
exchange  rate, but the direction of pressure was definitely  upward.
Labor unions became increasingly  active after 1987, following  the relaxation of
restrictions  on strike activity and wage bargaining. The pattern of labor union activity in the
late 1980s  and the early 1990s, in some ways, resembles the pattern of the late 1970s.
Unions conceived  their role as a self-interested  pluralistic pressure group, pushing for the
highest wage increases possible.  They did not develop a longer-term  vision in which
sustainable  real wage increases would be limited to increases in productivity.  A comparison
of the two key wage rounds in 1989 and 1991 reveals the evolution  of union attitudes. The
wage round of 1989 was mainly defensive -- a long-overdue  attempt to recover what workers
had lost in real terms during the decade.  The wage round of 1991 was offensive, however,
aimed to secure the maximum  real wage increase (interview  Enver Tacoglu, member of Turk
f§ governing board, November 1991). This is understandable,  given that labor's trust was
destroyed  by a long period of exclusion and by the refusal of business and other key groups
to make reciprocal concessions,  such accepting  adequate taxation.
Real wages rebounded strongly starting in 1989, and this accompanied  a real
revaluation  in purchasing terms.  (See Table 1)  The major private sector firms could afford
to give substantial  wage increases, especially in the export sectors, because they had enjoyed
high profits in the 1980s and had been able to make productivity-enhancing  investments. In
the public sector, however, wage increases proved much more burdensome. Most state-
owned firms had not increased productivity  in the 1980s as fast as the private sector, so the
wage increases often exceeded  their profit margins, necessitating  of central government
subsidies, price increases and reduced sales.
Fiscal and monetary policy
Going into the 1987 election the govemment stimulated  a boom with fiscal expansion,
while repressing inflation with restrained devaluation  and stagnant  public sector prices falling
in real terms.  Immediately  after the election they raised public sector prices, to stem the
losses by public enterprises, and resumed devaluations  at a pace to keep the real exchange
rate competitive. The government  realized that the measures would cause average prices to
rise, but expected, or at least hoped, that it would be one-time blip in the inflation rate, and
not persist.  The rise of electricity prices and other inputs to industry pushed inflation up
from under 40 to almost 80 percent, and it did not come down quickly.  Voters who had
elected ANAP for its record of economic  management  felt betrayed and turned against
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In 1988 the govemment  tried and failed to have a stabilization  led by fiscal
retrenchment. The stabilization  program of February 1988, designed to restabilize the
economy, caused a sharp fall in the growth rate, but without corresponding  success in
reducing  inflation.  Inflation rates of 60-70 per cent have become increasingly the norm in
the latter half of the decade, from an initial base of 25-30 per cent in 1983. This contrasted
sharply with a key promise of the ANAP govemment  in 1983, that inflation would be
reduced to 10 percent within a single year (Ulagay, 1987). As the decade progressed, this
promise became less and less credible, and the govemment  lost its resolve to reduce
inflation. It started making excuses for inflation as a price of rapid development,  replacing
the earlier declarations that inflation control was the central priority.' 8
Technocrats  in the central bank, treasury, and SPO understood well the policy
changes necessary  to reduce inflation -- namely to reduce fiscal deficits in a sustainable  way,
so that the central bank could slow the growth of domestic credit without starving in the
private sector.  The policy dialogue with the IMF and the World Bank in 1987-90 explored
the deficit-inflation  issue with the Turkish government,  and at the staff level they reached
fundamental  agreement. The politicians, at least some of whom also understood  the
economics, decided against tighter fiscal policy in the end, although several reforms may
have helped lay the basis for disinflation  later."9
Following  the example of the Bundesbank  and other central banks in industrial
countries, the Turkish Treasury and central bank agreed that there should be an annual
monetary  program.  The events of 1989-91, and even 1992, illustrate the difficulty  and
ultimately  the impossibility  of establishing  central bank independence  without the
government's commitment  to low fiscal deficits. The staff of Treasury and the central bank
developed  a monetary  program in 1989, although  without public announcement  -- effectively
a shadow  program.  It failed because of excess credit demands from the government. The
next year, with more foresight, the central bank and Treasury waited until the latter could
make a commitment  -- sign a protocol -- not to borrow more than a certain amount from the
central bank.  Then the central bank announced  a monetary program, to which it kept.  The
protocol did not stop treasury from increased borrowing, which was financed that year by
borrowing in the domestic capital market, to which foreign capital inflows were coming
strongly.
Events in the first half of 1991 illustrate the importance  of establishing  the precedent
and expectation  of the monetary program.  At the beginning  of 1991, the Minister of State
for Economy did not have Treasury issue a commitment  on the deficit and financing. The
Central Bank responded by declining to issue a monetary  plan.  Treasury furthermore
18.  Interview  with E. Kumcu.
19. The finance ministry,  under Pakdemirli,  did develop  in 1989  a comprehensive  tax reform that would have both raised
more revenue  and inproved efficiency, for instance  by establishing  a corporate  income tax.  The proposal  was rejected,
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insisted that the  central bank double its rate of financing  to the government, in order to hold
down the cost of borrowing.  The central bank recognized that it could not sustain both an
interest rate and an exchange rate targets and, rather than using up its foreign exchange
reserves to temporarily  hold to the two targets, it let the TL fall rapidly under market
pressure.  Treasury then retreated.  It was by then too late in the year for a formal protocol
and monetary program, but Treasury did agree to a fixed nominal limit on it monthly
borrowing from the central, which would progressively  contract in real terms.  The central
bank accepted the increase in money  base at the beginning  of the year but after March kept
central bank money growing at a rate slightly below the growth rate for 1990 which was
within the range in the monetary  program for that year (interview  with D. Gokce).
Without  exaggerating the degree of intra-bureaucratic  conflict, stronger disagreement
surfaced as the Central Bank became more autonomous  institution  during the latter half of the
1980s. The February 1988 stabilization  program, following  the mini-crisis associated  with
the pre-election boom of 1987, was prepared essentially  by the Central Bank, with no input
from SPO (although  the report itself which formed the basis of the February measures was
publicized as the joint product of the three key agencies: Central Bank, SPO and the
Treasury).  The first point for disagreement  or conflict revolved  around the exchange rate
policy.  The conflict was essentially  between SPO, on the one hand, and the Central Bank
and the Treasury on the other.  SPO opposed the real appreciation  of the exchange rate in
1989  and 1990 in terms of its potentially  negative impact on the tradable sector and long run
competitiveness  of the economy. The perspective was supported by econometric  evidence
which identified  the real exchange rate as the key determinant  of export performance  in the
Turkish case (Arslan and Van Wijnbergen, 1990; see also Barlow and Senses 1992 and for
an alternate view Celasun and Rodrik 1989). The second area of disagreement involved  the
timing of capital account liberalization  and transition to convertibility. Specifically,  the
Central Bank  opposed the August 1989 measures  involving  capital account  liberalization  on
the basis that such measures  were premature considering  the degree of instability which
existed at the macro-level. In this instance, the conflict involved the Central Bank and the
Treasury.  Finally, the Central Bank's monetary  program became a subject of disagreement.
Following  the introduction  of its monetary program in 1990, the Central Bank was criticized
by the other two key agencies that a monetary program would not be effective  unless it was
coordinated  with other macroeconomic  policies, in general, and control over the budget
deficit, in particular.
The problems of co-ordination  between the key bureaucratic agencies was aggravated
further by the political vacuum following  Ozal's election to the Presidency in November
1989. I§in Celebi, Minister of the State, took a basically pro-SPO stance (on the exchange
rate issue in particular) while Gunes Taner, the other Minister responsible for the economy,
has been on the Central Bank and the Treasury side particularly in relation to the exchange
rate issue.  Disagreement  over the exchange rate policy reflected SPO's greater emphasis  on
growth and long run competitiveness  plus the Central Bank and the Treasury's corresponding
concern with stabilization  and inflation. The Central Bank increased its influence  at the
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era.  This patte, - was clearly validated  by the attempt in summer 1991 to restructure the
economic bureauz.racy,  a few months prior to the general elections of 1991.  A primary
objective was to take implementation  functions  away from the SPO and to give it more of an
advisory role.
Political Management
Following  the second ANAP victory in the November 1987 elections, Ozal's direct
involvement  with economic  management  diminished, leading after that to fragmentation  and
lack of co-ordination in economic  decision making.  1987 was also a tuming point because of
the  reemergence  of wage pressures, repayment  of foreign debt (both the interest and the
principal) as a novel form of pressure on the budget and macroeconomic  balances, and the
increasing loss of control on the fiscal side which, in turn, created conflict between growth
and competitiveness,  on the one hand, and short run stabilization,  on the other.
Whereas Ozal and the ANAP party failed to mobilize  support from many of those
benefitting from trade liberalization  because the benefits were too diffuse and the top-down
style did not link in such support from the start, the failure to reap political support from the
beneficiaries  of stabilization  is more due to the government's failure to sustain stabilization.
When political support wavered, the government did not hark back to the success of the 1980
stabilization  and call for a return to sound fiscal policy; rather they usually tried populist
measures  that were fiscally damaging, such as restraining  public-sector  price increases,
increasing  public-sector  wages, and spending more on popular local projects.  When the
political situation became tight, the government  often seemed to give up campaigning  on the
basis of sound macroeconomic  policy, returning rather to strategies of interventionism  and
patronage.
From a political economy point of view, the trade liberalization  continued to expand
the group of winners from structural adjustment, albeit not quite as large a group as would
have existed with more predictable  policies.  But because the policies often changed
unpredictably  and without consultation  with those most directly affected, the creation of a
large group of gainers did not translate into corresponding  political support for the ANAP
government.  ANAP could run as the party of successful  structural adjustment  in 1983 and
1987, but this reputation had faded by 1991.
D.  LESSONS  FROM TURKEY
The wide variation in economic  and political outcomes  in Turkey since the beginning
of the 1980s  offers the opportunity  to draw important  lessons on what to do and what not to
do in politically managing  structural adjustment. We first summarize the balance of
achievements  and then tell what lessons seem to transcend the Turkish circumstances.48  Political  Economy  of Policy  Reform in Turkey
Balance of achievements
In terms of accomplishing  a structural reorientation  of the economy, the Turkish
adjustment  experience has been a huge success. The share of output for export rose from
five percent in 1979 to 23 percent in 1989, and real output roughly doubled. The financial
markets are not only open internationally,  in stark contrast to the pre 1980 situation, but they
have developed  depth and sophisticatior.  Even in the areas where the program must be
judged a failure as of the end of 1991 -- reducing  fiscal deficits, inflation, income inequality,
and the size of inefficient  public enterprise sector -- the transformations  of trade and finance
fundamentally  altered the context of the problems, changing their effects on the private sector
and changing the options for the government  to deal with them.
Although the first phase of economic adjustment  was sustained, though not initiated,
in an authoritarian  context, the Turks restored democracy when the agenda for reform was
incomplete.  ANAP won office on the platform of economic  success and eventually lost in
part because of failure of economic  policy. The electoral defeat of ANAP in 1991 did not
mean, however, the demise of the pro-structural adjustment  or the pro-liberalization
coalition. The long period of ANAP rule helped consolidate reforms to such a degree that
all the principal parties agreed on a broadly similar economic  program.  The ideological
differences  between the left and the right -- state-directed versus market-orientation  --
substantially  diminished.  Despite the persistence  of significant  distributional  conflicts, broad
agreement on the desirability  of market-oriented  reforms constituted an important source of
optimism for the future of structural adjustment  in an era of coalition politics.  Without sharp
ideological  conflicts, coalition  politics in the 1990s seemed unlikely to duplicate the highly
unstable pattern of the late 1970s.
While the reforms of the early 1980s  greatly reduced the importance  of rent-seeking,
particularly with regard to foreign trade, patronage politics by ANAP became more
widespread again in the latter half of the decade.  Hence, the initial strength that ANAP
derived from privileged access to state resources was progressively converted into a
disadvantage. As individuals  or firms with direct access to the government  proliferated, the
specific favors they managed to obtain led to growing resentment  and reaction on the part of
the wider populace.  The experience of over-invoicing  exports, or fictitious  exports in more
popular language, designed to take advantage  of favorable export subsidies, and the
subsequent failure of the government to adequately  discipline or penalize the companies
involved  also proved to be a major source of discontent.  The fictitious exports also
jeopardized the popularity of exporters, as a group, and the attempts since 1980 to build a
pro-export coalition.  Some key features of the import-substitution  regime continued.
Although  the private sector has become much more vibrant and competitive  in world
markets, a large public sector remained basically  intact at the end of the ANAP era, and
rent-seeking  was still prevalent.  Many people became disaffected  by ANAP's arbitrary
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included state economic enterprises, public banks and public sector contracts. The extra-
budgetary funds created new avenues for distribution  of rents.  Fiscal decentralization  during
the period, involving  the proliferation  of extra-budgetary  funds and increased spending
authority granted to municipalities,  also tended to amplify fiscal disequilibrium.
Top-down political liberalization
The hierarchical structure of ANAP, under a strong and dominant leader, helped the
party in the early and the mid-1980s,  but was increasingly  a disadvantage  during the latter
half of the decade.  Ozal's style of leadership  and his unwillingness  to delegate power
prevented a smooth transition of leadership  within the party.  Part of ANAP's defeat in the
1991 elections resulted in part from some of its constituency  transferring to the smaller
Islamic fundamentalist  party, which experienced  a striking increase in the share of votes
relative to the 1987 elections.
Furthermore, the political vacuum left by Ozal's ascendance  to the Presidency  created
divisions within the party and the government  itself, which were partly responsible  for the
problems with macro-economic  coordination. The divisions  within the party led eventually
to the withdrawal  of important  parts of the conservative-religious  faction.  In 1991, under the
leadership  of Mesut Yilmaz, a representative  of the liberal wing, ANAP recovered some of
its old cohesion and vitality.  While this process of recovery was reflected in the election
results of 1991, it was not sufficient to prevent defeat.
Empowered  technocrats
From a comparative perspective, the Turkish experience up to late 1987 shows the
effectiveness  of the key individual  lending a select group of technocrats  in securing the
necessary  degree of consistency  and bureaucratic cohesion  in the initiation of structural
adjustment.  Yet, once the leader departs, co-ordination  problems arise in the absence of an
autonomous  and internally coherent bureaucracy.
In retrospect, tl,e failures of macro policy in the latter 1980s  can be traced to three
forces.  First, a broad consultative  process had not been institutionalized  to cultivate popular
support for macro stability.  Second, the top bureaucrats lacked autonomy vis-a-vis the
politicians, and hence, were unable to counteract the pressures toward the expansion  of the
fiscal deficit.  Third, there were problems of co-ordination  and conflict within the
bureaucracy itself, which were accentuated  further by the appointment  in 1989 of two
separate Ministers (Gunes Taner and Iin  Celebi) both of whom tried to assume responsibility
for the running of the economy.
The highly centralized and insulated  policy apparatus which Ozal created in the early
1980s proved to be useful in initiating  and sustaining  reform through its early stages.  Yet,
insulation and lack of institutionalized  links with interest groups increasingly  turned out to be50  Political  Economy  of Policy  Reform in Turkey
a disadvantage  coordinating  policy and managing  distributional  conflicts under conditions  of
fully competitive  politics in the late 1980s.
Dealing with interest groups
Political management  of the reform process requires coalition building to deal with
interest groups -- developing  each part of the reform package so that it contributes to the
overall objectives  of the program and at the same time satisfies the relevant groups enough
for them to go along with the overall program, even if other parts are not to their liking.
Turkey had mixed success in this regard.
The support of large-scale business was the domestic counterpart of extensive  external
assistance, both factors contributing  toward the success of structural adjustment efforts.
Conglomerates  occupy a pivotal position in the Turkish economy.  By 1980, the major
conglomerates  represented by TuSIAD had recognized  that the import-substitution  model
which involved  sales to a heavily protected home market was no longer a feasible option.
The conglomerates  smoothed  the path for trade liberalization. They had been the bastions  of
import-substitution  during the 1960s and the 1970s, but emerged as the principal exporters in
the 1980s. The dominant role of export-import  companies, the majority of which were the
subsidiaries  of the major conglomerates,  in the export surge of the 1980s clearly testifies the
validity of this proposition.
The absence of serious distributional  pressures on policy-makers  for a considerable
period (due to the authoritarian  regime during the 1980-1983  phase and limited political
liberalization  during the 1983-1987  era) also proved to be a key factor which contributed to a
process of smooth adjustment from a position of acute crisis.  Real wage flexibility, due to
the political exclusion of labor up to 1987, contributed to the short-run  economic success of
structural adjustment, although  with obvious costs in terms of the objective of democracy  and
income equality.  The pattern of labor relations after 1987, which fits neither the "exclusion"
nor the "corporatist intermediation"  categories, clearly has been a source of instability.
TUSIAD recently sponsored a study that recommends  the creation of an Economic  and Social
Council, which would bring together, in a formalized and legally recognized setting,
representatives  of business (TOBB, TUSIAD, Turk-Trade, and TISK, the employers'
association),  labor (Turk-Is and DISK, recently legalized), agriculture (TOZB), and the
government. The Council would work to create a consensus  on the framework for economic
policy and on the specific measures  to effect it.  It would provide feedback and guidance
during the implementation  piocess (Onis and Sunar, 1992).
Packaging  and tradeoffs between  macro and trade reforms
The Turkish case illustrates both the benefits of packaging trade and macro reforms,
in order tc make both of them more politically  acceptable, and the dangers of letting trade
and financial  sector reforms attract financing  that permits a continuation  of non-adjustment  in
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The crisis of 1979-80  created for most Turks a mental association  between
unavailability  of import goods and the problems  of the old economic  policy regime.
Consequently,  through the 1980s, trade reforms were widely recognized as being in the
interest of the average man, rather than as concessions  to foreign or internationalist  interests.
Export subsidies in the form of low interest credit and tax rebates played an important role in
the Turkish case in terms of encouraging  exports and helping to build a pro-export coalition.
Thus an unorthodox instrument helped to buy support for the more conventional  instruments
such as exchange rate devaluation  and import liberalization.
Packaging fiscal reforms to help stabilize the economy with trade and exchange rate
reforms to alleviate the balance of payments  crisis in early 1980s helped to make both kinds
of reform more attractive  politically.  There was also a pattern in the late 1980s, however, of
making additional  and more radical trade ard exchange rate reforms instead of doing the
necessary macroeconomic  measures, especially  reducing the fiscal deficit.  This exacerbated
economic  problems over the longer term, although  it did help the government  get continued
financing  over the short term and alleviated  some other symptoms  of macroeconomic
problems.
Speed of reform
A large portion of the reforms were initiated in two windows of politicai jpportunity
when the government  had a mandate for dramatic  action -- in the baIance  of payments crisis
of 1980 and in the post-democratization  honeymoon  of 1983-4.  Making  reforms rapidly was
important at these junctures.  Later in the 1980s, as the democratic  process became more
routine, reforms succeeded  when they were carefully prepared in consultation  with the
groups affected.  Crash programs and gradualism were thus each appropriate for different
circumstances.
External financing
The substantial  external assistance that Turkey received in the early 1980s contributed
to a large supply response and, hence, to a speedy recovery, which reduced the costs of
stabilization  and structural adjustment. The scale and speed of the recovery helped the policy
makers  justify the program to broad segments  of the population, to override opposition, and
to consolida:e a pio-reform coalition.  Given the acute import-starvation  of the Turkish
economy at the peak of the crisis, rapid recovery would not have been feasible in the absence
of external assistance on a substantial  scale.  Slow recovery would have jeopardized the
future of the program.
In the later 1980s, however, Turkey's success in getting external financing -- from
commercial  as well as official sources, and the success of the government  in getting domestic
financing, unfortunately  allowed the government to pursue expansionary  fiscal policies for
short-term political motives. This caused serious problems  with inflation and eventually with
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Challenges  for the 1990s
The twin challenges  that Turkey faced as it entered the 1990s were to consolidate  and
broaden democracy and to renew the efforts at economic  reform.  Consolidating  democracy
would involve expanding human rights and the avenues for political discussion of economic
interests. The experience of the 1980s had modernized  the economy and had removed many
of the ideological  impediments to policy formation, which had paralyzed it in the 1970s.
The political culture remained paternalistic, ho'vever, so that the democratic  incentives  to
seek popular support were channelled  into patronage and the direct provision of benefits,
which made good macroeconomic  policy almost impossible. To meet also the challenge  of
economic  reform would require political and institutional  innovations  to resolve distributional
conflicts -- over issues like wages, taxation, and agricultural  support prices -- and to avoid
populist solutionis.Figure 1.  bTurkey:  Deficits, Inflation and Elections, 1981 - 1991
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Appendix 1.  The Budget Process
The problems  in inter-agency  coordination  for economic  policy in Turkey are well
illustrated  by the routine established  after 1983 for making the annual government  budget.  In
the first phase, the Budget Department  in the Ministry of Finance gathers current expenditure
requests forms from the various parts of the central government and collates them.  SPO puts
together the investment budget.  It is a more political process, with requests coming from
various ministries and members of parliament, who are the conduits for any interest group
pressure.  Only ANAP deputies participated  in the process during their tenure in power;
opposition  parties were totally shut out of the process.  SPO receives the requests and
collates and reconciles them with the 5-year plan.  the draft budgets for the SEEs are done in
Treasury, with input from SPO on the investment  program.  In the second phase, SPO,
Treasury , and the Budget Department  of the Finance Ministry bring together their parts of
the draft budget and reconcile them with the macroeconomic  program for the coming year.
Treasury prepares this program on the basis of the macroeconomic  forecasting done in SPO.
The output from the three agencies, the Technical Budget, is passed up to the High Planning
Council.  Here the Prime Minister and other top politicians make final adjustments  and then
submit the Budget to Parliament for approval.  Further changes in parliament  are usually
minor -- mainly adjusting salary levels and making a few changes in public investment.
Implementing  the budget  is the task of Treasury.  There is always some divergence
between the planned budget and the outcome, and this is inevitable  given that the budget is
formulated in nominal terms when inflation makes it impossible for the government to
forecast accurately  the path of prices over the year.  If the government wants to convince
Parliament of the need for fiscal tightening, it will understate  revenues.  If the Budget
Commission,  an inter-agency  organization, decides on spending  cuts (usually across the
board), it passes these on to the Finance Ministry to enact.  (Vis a vis the EBFs, Treasury
usually tries to understate revenues and claw back revenue from them.)  Unanticipated
inflation or political pressures may lead the government to decide to have an extra-
contractual  adjustment  of public-sector  wages. 20
20. Interview  with Y. Ege, N. Akturk.56  Political Econony  of Policy Reform in Turkey
Appendix Table 1.  Advance Deposits on Imports  (percent)
Before 1/24/80  After 1/24/80  1/81 to 12/83
Liberalized  List I  l
Importers  40  30  20
Industrialists  25  15  10
Liberalized  List 11
Importers  40  20  20
Industrialists  25  10  10
Quota List  abolished
Importers  10  20
Industrialists  2.5  10
Public Sector Imports  --  0
Additional  Deposit Requirements  .
Acceptance  Credits  _1
Imports against documents  and  50  20
suppliers credits
Source: OECD Economic Surveys,  Turkey, March 1981,  p. 48.Political Economy  of Policy Reform  in Turkey  57
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